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BATTLEGROUND OF THE OPIOID CRISIS: THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO MEDICATION-ASSISTED
TREATMENT IN PRISONS AND JAILS, AND UPON RELEASE
ABSTRACT
About eighty percent of all inmates in the United States need but will not
receive treatment for their Opioid Use Disorder (OUD). Instead, they will leave
prison with a 140 times greater chance of a fatal overdose than before their
prison sentence. Although incarceration is conceivably an opportune time for
the state to connect individuals with treatment, only about one percent of prisons
and jails allow the use of Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT). This failure
has a myriad of causes. Notably, beliefs that OUD is a moral failure and that
MAT either does not work or is dangerous are both among the most salient and
most dubious justifications for withholding treatment. Inmates instead undergo
forced withdrawal, a form of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
Worse yet, regardless of whether an individual receives MAT in prison,
facilities overwhelmingly lack reentry procedures that connect former inmates
with MAT programs in the community. Because even one day without MAT can
propel an individual with OUD into relapse and a fatal overdose, post-release
treatment is crucial. Prison policies directly impact inmates’ tolerance and
likelihood of overdose upon release. Accordingly, this Comment argues that
MAT, both in jail and post-release, is within the purview of the Eighth
Amendment.
This Comment focuses on Pesce v. Coppinger to illustrate the shortcomings
of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which have left a large subset of the
population without treatment for OUD and do nothing to address post-release
overdose rates directly linked to the state. Although some plaintiffs have
successfully obtained MAT on Eighth Amendment grounds, the current
jurisprudence is insufficient to effectuate inmates’ right to treatment, both
during and after incarceration.
To fully effectuate the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, this Comment argues that changes are needed in the
current jurisprudence to recognize the State’s carceral bargain and a
corresponding expanded definition of “punishment.” Coupled with a harm
reduction argument, these two changes fully recognize inmates’ right to MAT
and society’s evolving standard of decency.
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INTRODUCTION
A look inside the United States’ prisons and jails reveals the key
battleground of the nation’s decades-long opioid crisis that has come out of the
war on drugs.1 An estimated 80% of the 2.3 million inmates need life-saving
treatment for opioid use disorder (“OUD”),2 but because “only a small
percentage receive any help at all,”3 they face a shockingly high and seemingly
insurmountable risk of overdose upon release.4 If forced to withdraw and abstain
from opioids while in jail, a person with OUD loses their tolerance and “raise[s]
the risk of . . . overdose in the first few weeks of reentry by a factor of 140”
compared to the general population.5
The solution to this problem? A prescription for one of the three evidencebased,6 Federal Drug Administration (FDA)-approved Medication-Assisted
Treatment (MAT) drugs for opioid dependency—Buprenorphine, Methadone,

1
See Leo Beletsky, Sequester the Drug War: Drug Control Spending and the Opportunity to Stop
Throwing Good Money After Bad, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/war-on-drugs-spending_b_
3367725 (July 31, 2013) (detailing the United States’ supply and demand reduction tactic, and the accompanying
massive spending, as having no real effect on Americans’ drug abuse but nonetheless increasing international
violence and human rights abuses).
2
Leo Beletsky, Lindsay LaSalle, Michelle Newman, Janine Par, James Tam & Alyssa Tochka, Fatal
Re-Entry: Legal and Programmatic Opportunities to Curb Opioid Overdose Among Individuals Newly Released
from Incarceration, 7 NE. U. L.J. 149, 151 (2015); see also Press Release, Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner,
Prison Policy Initiative, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020 (Mar. 24, 2020) (available at https://www.
prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html) (“450,000 are incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses on any given
day.”).
3
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 152.
4
The risk of overdose is not limited to post incarceration. Id. at 156. Drugs are “sporadic[cally]
availab[le]” in jail, and inmates’ decreased tolerance and intense cravings from withdrawal make them
susceptible to overdose in jail as well. Id.; see id. at 156 n.29 (listing instances of drug overdoses in prisons).
5
Leo Beletsky & Jeremiah Goulka, The Opioid Crisis: A Failure of Regulatory Design and Action, 34
CRIM. JUST. 35, 39 (2019). A 2017 report found that fifty-eight percent of people in state prisons either have a
drug dependence or misuse drugs, while about five percent of the general population meet these same criteria.
German Lopez, How America’s Prisons Are Fueling the Opioid Epidemic, VOX, https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2018/3/13/17020002/prison-opioid-epidemic-medications-addiction (Mar. 26, 2018, 9:20 AM).
However, the disparity in treatment produces the opposite outcome for inmates: “[L]ess than five percent of
people who were referred to [OUD] treatment through the justice system received [M]ethadone or
[B]uprenorphine, compared to nearly forty-one percent of people referred through other sources.” Id.
6
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, HOW EFFECTIVE ARE MEDICATIONS TO TREAT OPIOID USE DISORDER?
4 (2021), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/medications-to-treat-opioid-addiction/efficacymedications-opioid-use-disorder. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is defined as “the conscientious, explicit,
judicious and reasonable use of modern, best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients”
by “integrat[ing] clinical experience and patient values with the best available research information.” Izet Masic,
Milan Miokovic & Belma Muhamedagic, Evidence Based Medicine–New Approaches and Challenges, 16 ACTA
INFORMATIC MEDICA: J. ACAD. MED. SCI. BOSN. & HERZ. 219, 219 (2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3789163.
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or Naltrexone7—marketed as “safe to use for months, years, or even a lifetime.”8
MAT has been “unequivocally recommended” for jails and prisons by the Office
of National Drug Control Policy and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.9
Importantly, there are real people affected by the bureaucratic policies, as
well as massive financial figures and a staggering death toll associated with the
opioid crisis. Prisons’ opioid treatment and reentry policies are felt at an
individual, family, and community level throughout the country.10 Geoffrey
Pesce recently sued Essex County so that he could continue to take his
prescription Methadone treatment while serving a sixty-day sentence.11 Before
starting Methadone, Pesce was unemployed, homeless, and estranged from his
family for years;12 he overdosed six times and attempted detoxification four
times.13 Now, with Methadone, he financially supports his family as a mechanic
and once again parents his son.14 In 2018, Brenda Smith sued the Aroostook
County Sheriff in Maine so that she could continue to take the Buprenorphine
that she has been prescribed since 2014.15 Like Mr. Pesce, Ms. Smith’s
maintenance dose of Buprenorphine enabled her to “regain[] custody of her four
7
Naltrexone works differently than Methadone and Buprenorphine and “ha[s] thus far been shown to be
inferior . . . and far less cost-effective,” resulting in “double the number of overdoses . . . compared with . . .
[B]uprenorphine.” Leo Beletsky, 21st Century Cures for the Opioid Crisis: Promise, Impact, and Missed
Opportunities, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 365, 365 n.54 (2018). Naltrexone works by blocking the euphoric effect
of opioids, whereas Buprenorphine and Methadone prevent withdrawal symptoms and “facilitate extinction
learning . . . because patients learn that they will not get the same ‘high’ from taking illicit drugs.” Complaint &
Request for Emergency Injunctive Relief at 8, Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 18CV-11972).
8
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., MAT Medications, Counseling, and Related Conditions,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/
medications-counseling-related-conditions (Mar. 4, 2022).
9
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 163.
10
See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 5 (“Overdose deaths are a tragic proxy for general problems with addiction
here, but addiction has many more effects. It destroys people’s career, drives them to crime, breaks up families,
and causes secondary health problems . . . made much more likely when people can’t get access to adequate
treatment [while in prison].”).
11
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for TRO & Preliminary Injunction at 1,
Pesce, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35 (No. 18-CV-11972). In a cruel twist, Mr. Pesce’s license had been revoked prerecovery and his mother typically drove him to the treatment facility where he received his Methadone. Id. When
she was unexpectedly unavailable, Mr. Pesce drove himself to the facility and was pulled over while driving six
miles over the speed limit with a revoked license. Id.
12
Id.
13
Complaint, supra note 7, at 14.
14
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1.
15
Smith v. Aroostook County, 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 149 (D. Me. 2019) (order granting preliminary
injunction). Ms. Smith has been on MAT since 2009. Id. A lengthy treatment time is not uncommon, as “[m]uch
like other chronic and relapsing conditions, OUD typically requires long-term (even life-long) treatment.”
Beletsky, supra note 7, at 364.
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children, secure[] stable housing[,] . . . obtain[] employment[,] . . . earn[] her
high school diploma[,] and . . . take college courses.”16 Ms. Smith has not used
drugs in five years.17 Inmates and advocates are catching on. Mr. Pesce and Ms.
Smith are just a few of the recent plaintiffs who have argued against prisons’
prohibition on MAT based on either the Eighth Amendment or Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).18
The fact remains that, in the vast majority of cases, inmates with OUD
undergo forced withdrawal in prison,19 resulting in a drastically decreased opioid
tolerance and devastatingly high risk of death upon release.20 More often than
not, inmates receive no treatment in prison or post-release and can relapse in “a
matter of days.”21 Although some inmates have been able to assert protection for
MAT treatment under the ADA, the Act is alarmingly underinclusive relative to
the number of people who need treatment.22 Further, even in prisons and jails
that provide MAT, poor reentry policies often negate the resources expended
and any medical progress made in prison.23 Inmates with OUD are essentially
forced into a lose-lose situation: undergo withdrawal in custody or start
treatment and risk overdose upon release if they are not connected to a MAT
provider in the community.24
This Comment argues that an individual’s time in prison and subsequent
reentry are so inextricably linked that the Eighth Amendment requires prisons
and jails to at least minimally facilitate connecting individuals with MAT in the
community if they received it in prison or have a known OUD. Based on Sharon
Dolovich’s theory of the state’s carceral bargain and an alternative definition of
16

Smith, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (order granting preliminary injunction).
Id. at 150.
18
See infra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
19
Beletsky & Goulka, supra note 5.
20
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21
Lopez, supra note 5. Lopez details the story of a man named Casey, who, before receiving medication
for opioid addiction in a Rhode Island prison, had relapsed repeatedly after release, “not only exposing himself
to the risk of a deadly overdose but leading to a spiral of drug use that . . . often[] landed him in prison again.”
Id.
22
See Beth Schwartzapfel, When Going to Jail Means Giving Up the Meds That Saved Your Life, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 29, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/01/29/when-going-tojail-means-giving-up-the-meds-that-saved-your-life (“[M]uch of how the ADA applies in these situations is
open to interpretation . . . .”). According to the ADA, someone “currently using drugs illegally,” even with a
prescription for MAT, does not qualify for protection under the Act. Id.
23
See Erick Trickey, How the Smallest State Is Defeating America’s Biggest Addiction Crisis, POLITICO
MAG. (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/25/rhode-island-opioids-inmates219594 (“You shouldn’t even think about doing a [MAT program] . . . in a correctional setting if you don’t
connect with [inmates] after release.” (second alteration in original)).
24
See id.
17
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“punishment,” this Comment will show that not providing access to MAT postrelease is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
recognizing that even with the shortest sentences, “sending people with
addiction into jail or prison may be a death sentence” once they are released.25
It is not only cruel and unusual but it is also unacceptable for a seven-day jail
sentence to end in death.26
To begin, Part I examines the origins of the United States’ opioid crisis and
provides a basic understanding of the science of addiction, withdrawal, and
MAT, as well as prison and jail withdrawal policies. Then, Part II details the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, recent successful cases in which plaintiffs
obtained injunctive relief against prisons barring MAT use, and the limitations
of current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the MAT context in relation to
the ADA. Part III explains Sharon Dolovich’s alternative Eighth Amendment
framework based on constructive knowledge, the carceral bargain, and a more
inclusive definition of “punishment.”27 Part III then applies Dolovich’s
framework to recent MAT litigation and argues for its adoption and application
to cases of post-release treatment. In further support of an alternative framework,
Part III also details a harm reduction argument for supplying MAT. In light of a
difficult Eighth Amendment argument and the life-or-death nature of this issue,
Part IV details the compelling public policy arguments in favor of widespread
access to MAT both within prisons and post-release.
I.

OPIOIDS AND MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT: HISTORY AND
BACKGROUND

The 1990s saw an increase in the legitimate, prescription use of opioids.28
As doctors began to prescribe opioids for serious illnesses,29 pharmaceutical
companies aggressively marketed their products as safe and effective to the tune
of a $2.9 billion increase in OxyContin sales between 1996 and 2002.30
Predictably, between 1990 and 2001, lethal overdoses doubled.31 The Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) responded by prosecuting doctors at an

25

Beletsky & Goulka, supra note 5.
See infra Part III.C.
27
See infra Part III.A–B.
28
Beletsky & Goulka, supra note 5, at 36.
29
Id.
30
Joseph Y. Shenkar, All Hands on Deck: The Case for Incorporating Medically Assisted Treatment into
the Criminal Justice System in South Carolina, 70 S.C. L. REV. 849, 852 (2019) (describing persistent
minimization of addiction risks for opioid users on behalf of pharmaceutical company Purdue).
31
Beletsky & Goulka, supra note 5, at 36.
26
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alarming rate,32 resulting in both an acute shortage of opioids for legitimate
patients and a shift to black market pain medications and heroin.33
For many, heroin has recently become the drug of choice because it is “five
to eight times cheaper than a black-market OxyContin.”34 Accordingly, lethal
overdose rates tripled between 2010 and 2015.35 In response, the DEA
quintupled heroin seizures while the Department of Justice began using strictliability statutes to hold suppliers responsible for overdose deaths.36 These
strategies “add[ed] substantial barriers and costs to an illicit drug supply chain”
but did not reduce demand.37 Traffickers were incentivized to “minimize the
volume of trafficked goods while maximizing their potency to maximize
profit.”38 This resulted in fentanyl and the current state of the opioid crisis.
Traffickers certainly achieved potency—fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, “is now
the leading cause of death for people under fifty five.”39 From June 2020 to June
2021, over ninety-nine thousand people died because of fentanyl.40
As if the massive loss of life is not enough, reports estimate that from 2001
to 2017 the “cost of the opioid crisis . . . exceeded $1 trillion in the form of lost
wages, lost productivity, lost tax revenue, as well as government spending on
health care, social services, education, and criminal justice.”41
It is against this backdrop that inmates suffer and die from a of lack of access
to effective OUD treatment.42 The potency of the opioid crisis and unfettered
access to opioids makes it even more problematic to reintroduce inmates into the

32
Id. at 36–37. At the same time, doctors and health care providers had advocated for Buprenorphine and
protested to no avail against its rescheduling to a more restrictive category of the Controlled Substance Act. Id.
at 36.
33
Id. at 37.
34
Id. (reporting that ninety-four percent of heroin users switched to heroin because prescription opioids
were more costly and harder to get). OxyContin is a brand name for the drug Oxycodone. U.S. DRUG ENF’T
ADMIN., Oxycodone, https://www.dea.gov/factsheets/oxycodone (last visited May 3, 2022). It is a semi-synthetic
opioid drug prescribed for pain. Id.
35
Beletsky & Goulka, supra note 5, at 38.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 39 (“[F]rom 2014 to 2015, deaths involving opioid synthetics almost doubled.”).
40
Ahmad FB, Rossen LM & Sutton P, Vital Statistics Rapid Release: Provisional Drug Overdose Death
Counts, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS. (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm.
41
Aila Hoss, Legalizing Harm Reduction, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 826 (2019) (emphasis added).
42
Lopez, supra note 5 (“[T]he majority of state prisons don’t offer full access to . . . the mainline form
of treatment for opioid addiction.”).
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community without access to MAT.43 Coupled with a scientific understanding
of addiction, the inefficacy of prison and jail policies is even more apparent.
This Part will explain three background concepts crucial to understanding
why withholding MAT is “incompatible with the evolving standards of decency
. . . of a maturing society,” and thus a violation of the prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment:44 (1) the science of addiction versus the societal
misunderstanding of addiction as a moral failure; (2) the preference of prisons
and jails for forced withdrawal; and (3) the physical and psychological
consequences of forced withdrawal for inmates.
A. The Science of Addiction and Withdrawal Versus Addiction as a Moral
Affliction
To many, it is hard to understand why opioid users would go to such great
lengths to use a drug that is extremely dangerous and potentially lethal.45 The
reality is that incarceration is often a byproduct of addiction, with “4 in 10 state
prisoners and sentenced jail inmates”46 incarcerated either “because of their drug
use”47 or crimes committed in an effort to procure drugs.48 This section will first
provide a scientific explanation of how opioid use rewires a person’s brain.
Then, this section juxtaposes the scientific explanation with the societal
misconceptions about OUD and MAT to show the incongruity between the two.
The explanation for such “reckless” behavior is simple—people with OUD
are addicted and their brains have the neurobiological adaptations to match.49
Neurobiological adaptations are a result of continuous opioid use during which
opioid receptor agonists “bind[] to and [activate] certain receptors on cells,
preventing a biological response” and resulting in a “chronic, relapsing disorder
43
The problem is not new. Since the 1990s, the United States’ unyielding response has been to ignore
evidence-based treatment while policing drugs and failing to reduce supply. Beletsky & Goulka, supra note 5,
at 36.
44
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)).
45
See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 5 (“One big reason for the dire circumstances [driving prisons’ resistance
to offering medications] is stigma.”).
46
JENNIFER BRONSON, JESSICA STROOPS, STEPHANIE ZIMMER & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, DRUG USE,
DEPENDENCE, AND ABUSE AMONG STATE PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2007-2009, at 6 (2017) (finding that
one-third of drug offenders committed crimes to obtain drugs and one in six violent offenses were committed to
obtain drugs).
47
Lopez, supra note 5.
48
See id. (discussing how Casey’s addiction “landed him in prison”).
49
See R. Douglas Bruce & Rebecca A. Schleifer, Ethical and Human Rights Imperatives to Ensure
Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Dependence in Prisons and Pre-Trial Detention, 19 INT’L J. DRUG
POL’Y 17, 18 (2008) (“[T]he overwhelming physical and psychological reward that comes from heroin derails a
neurobiological system designed to preserve the individual.”).
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requiring longitudinal therapy.”50 Thus, as a person goes through the three stages
of addiction—binging, withdrawal, and anticipation51—the brain expects
opioids and “will do all it can to move the individual to obtain[] and us[e]
[them].”52
A common scenario that illustrates the widespread misunderstanding of
opioid use is the experience of Dr. Josiah Rich, co-director of Rhode Island’s
Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights.53 Dr. Rich recalls asking a prison
nurse to give an inmate in withdrawal medicine to ease his physical symptoms.54
The nurse responded, “No, we don’t do that. He’s supposed to suffer. That way
he won’t come back again.”55 The nurse’s response reflects not only a
misunderstanding of the science of opioid addiction56 but also what Dr. Rich
refers to as a view toward people with OUD as “somewhat subhuman.”57 In
reality, individuals suffering from OUD have essentially rewired their brains
from prolonged opioid use such that they have “derail[ed] a neurobiological
system designed to preserve the individual”58—the inmate could have no longer
“learned a lesson” through withdrawal. To make rational choices to avoid, for
example, “infectious diseases . . . [or] incarceration,” an opioid user has to
literally “go against this neurobiological [adaptation].”59 A person does not
merely choose to work against this latent neurobiological adaptation. Once
society stops conceptualizing addiction as a choice or matter of will, MAT will
be all the more compelling.
The reality is that people need MAT to overcome their brain’s rewiring, but
the lack of understanding and empathy, illustrated by the prison nurse, point to
two major barriers to providing it in jails, in prisons, and upon release.60
Remarkably, these barriers are neither financial nor bureaucratic, but are instead
based on the personal beliefs and misunderstandings of prison officials and
50
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA:
THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 2-9 (2016); Bruce & Schleifer, supra
note 49.
51
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 50, at 2-6.
52
Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49.
53
Trickey, supra note 23.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49 (“[T]here is widespread failure in prisons to understand that
opioid dependence is a medical disorder resulting from complex neurobiological systems.”).
57
Trickey, supra note 23.
58
Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49.
59
Id.
60
See Lopez, supra note 5. (“First, there’s the fact that these are prisoners, which simply makes it much
harder for people to empathize with them.”).
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society.61 First, because of the “conflation of substance use and morality,” many
people do not view MAT as an appropriate treatment for OUD.62 Instead of a
disease, OUD is seen as a blameworthy “moral failure.”63 This paints the picture
of opioid users as unworthy or undeserving of adequate treatment and provides
an easy justification for prison policies.64 Second, there is a widespread belief65
among the general public, certain policymakers, prison officials, and healthcare
providers “that [MAT] simply ‘substitute[es] one drug for another.’”66 Coupled
with the idea of drug use as a moral failure, it becomes nearly unthinkable to
provide MAT in prisons and jails.
In reality, MAT stabilizes an individual with OUD so that they “can function
normally,”67 without producing a high or intoxication.68 Methadone and
Buprenorphine are forms of opioids, meaning they also produce a biological
response,69 but the dosage, called a maintenance dose, is only enough to prevent
“withdrawal symptoms, control[] cravings, and stabilize[] patients.”70
Additionally, Naltrexone works by “blocking the psychoactive effect of
opioids,”71 but it causes withdrawal if there are opioids in the system and can
only be used “after a complete detoxification.”72 MAT is proven to “reduce risk61
Other barriers include the cost of providing MAT in prisons and jails given that “health care services
already constitute[] the largest and fastest-rising component of correctional spending.” Beletsky et al., supra
note 2, at 159. Additionally, prison and jail populations are inherently “some of the most disenfranchised
members of our society” who often lack the capital and opportunity to demand a change in treatment. Id. at 159–
60.
62
Beletsky, supra note 7, at 367.
63
See Lopez, supra note 5. Most prisons provide an exception to MAT-prohibition policies for pregnant
inmates because withdrawal during pregnancy could be fatal to the fetus. Id. Lopez identifies the underlying
assumption that “the inmate is to blame for her opioid addiction,” but since the fetus “is obviously innocent . . .
everything must be done to save it.” Id.
64
Id.
65
Trickey, supra note 23.
66
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 50, at 4-22; Trickey, supra note 23.
67
Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49.
68
Maia Szalavitz, The Wrong Way to Treat Opioid Addiction, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/17/opinion/treating-opioid-addiction.html.
69
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 50, at 4-22.
70
Beletsky, supra note 7, at 364. The right dose can be difficult to calculate and requires trial and error,
which is why it is “critical” to have all three MAT options available in prisons and jails. Lopez, supra note 5.
When choosing the specific medication, providers have to consider the particular person’s preference, history of
opioid use, use of other substances, “co-occurring psychiatric or medical conditions,” prior treatment history,
and family history. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., USE OF MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT FOR OPIOID USE DISORDER IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SETTINGS
1, 24 (2019) [hereinafter SAMHSA], https://store.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/d7/priv/pep19-matusecjs.pdf.
71
Beletsky, supra note 7, at 365.
72
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 50, at 4-24. Rhode Island’s prison data shows that
“[N]altrexone is far and away the least popular” of the three medications offered, with four inmates choosing it
in a six-month period while “180 took [M]ethadone and 119 took [B]uprenorphine.” Lopez, supra note 5.
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taking behavior” and, when opioid users have “psychological stress [or] comorbid mental illnesses,” enable the individual to stabilize “other medical and
psychiatric diseases” that may otherwise hinder recovery.73 It is far more
complex and effective than merely substituting one drug for another—it gives
an individual their life back.
The deep-rooted and often-cited justifications for denying MAT are simply
untenable in the face of the scientific explanation of addiction. Like any other
chronic disease, OUD requires comprehensive treatment, but the fact remains
that criminalization of drug use and the corresponding limited reach of the
Eighth Amendment and the ADA allow for the persistence of “unnecessary and
discriminatory barriers to recovery.”74 MAT is undeniably an effective and
crucial piece of recovery from OUD, and, as this Comment will show, it is
constitutionally required.
B. Prison and Jail Policies Generally Prohibit MAT in Favor of Forced
Withdrawal
Prisons and jails overwhelmingly favor withdrawal and detoxification as
policy when a new inmate presents with OUD,75 despite the fact that the standard
of care is to provide and continue MAT.76 Of five thousand prisons and jails,
less than one percent allow MAT.77 About two hundred jails provide Naltrexone
to inmates close to or upon release78 because it “blocks the effects of opioids” to
prevent overdose.79 Naltrexone, however, is only a short-term solution and does
not consistently reduce cravings.80 Though it can prevent an overdose death

73

Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49.
Schwartzapfel, supra note 22.
75
Emily Mann, Advocating for Access: How the Eighth Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act
Open a Pathway for Opioid-Addicted Inmates to Receive Medication-Assisted Treatment, 29 ANNALS HEALTH
L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 231, 240 (2020). Only Rhode Island currently provides Buprenorphine, Methadone, and
Naltrexone to any inmate presenting with OUD. Christine Vestal, New Momentum for Addiction Treatment
Behind Bars, PEW: STATELINE (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/
04/04/new-momentum-for-addiction-treatment-behind-bars. As of 2018, thirty-five of the fifty states provide
either no addiction medication in prisons and jails or only the less-effective Naltrexone right before release. Id.
76
Motion for Class Certification at 10, Kortlever v. Whatcom County, No. 2:18-CV-00823 (W.D. Wash.
July 13, 2018); see also Hilary Smith Connery, Medication-Assisted Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder: Review
of the Evidence and Future Directions, 23 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 63, 64 (2015) (“[M]ethadone maintenance
remains the gold standard of care for OUD.”).
77
Mann, supra note 75.
78
Vestal, supra note 75.
79
Lopez, supra note 5.
80
Id.
74
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shortly after release, one dose before release will not put the individual in
recovery, nor will it curb use while the individual is in custody.81
Most prisons and jails have a blanket policy prohibiting MAT82 and only
allow exceptions for pregnant inmates.83 The best an inmate can hope for is that
the withdrawal policy includes providing medication to address the physical
symptoms, such as Imodium, Tylenol, or antihistamines for nausea.84 Worse yet,
some facilities practice “drug-free” detoxification in which the individual is not
given any medication to help with withdrawal symptoms as a form of
punishment to “motivate addicts to remain clean.”85 During a drug-free
detoxification, an inmate’s only comfort may be “a jug of water or juice during
the period of acute withdrawal.”86 In the vast majority of situations, forced
withdrawal is inevitable once an individual with OUD is booked into custody.87
Equally harmful post-release policies also do little to connect inmates with
MAT upon release.88 For example, an audit of the District of Columbia revealed
it took thirty-three days, on average, “to connect [released inmates] to treatment
options.”89 An individual is at the highest risk of overdose in the first fourteen
days after reentry.90
Though policies within jails and prisons have improved in the last two years,
this progress has been slow and piecemeal, happening mostly on a county-bycounty or jail-by-jail basis.91 While no doubt important, cases by and large
require an “individualized assessment[s] of inmates’ medical needs for MAT,”

81

Id.
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 196.
83
Lopez, supra note 5.
84
Motion, supra note 76.
85
Mann, supra note 75.
86
Motion, supra note 76.
87
Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
88
SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 5 (“Less than half of state and federal prisons in 2009 referred inmates for
[M]ethadone maintenance after release, and less than one-third provided referrals for [B]uprenorphine.”). The
statistics are even worse for someone with OUD on probation or parole: in 2014, less than five percent of people
referred to OUD treatment received Methadone or Buprenorphine. Id. at 8.
89
Peter Jamison, Many D.C. Drug Users Not Receiving Consistent Treatment After Arrests, Audit Shows,
WASH. POST. (Aug. 25, 2020, 4:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/many-dc-drug-users-not-receivingconsistent-treatment-after-arrests-audit-shows/2020/08/25/9854385a-e617-11ea-970a-64c73a1c2392_story.
html.
90
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 152. In D.C., eight out of ten “victims of lethal drug overdoses” never
made contact with the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health. Jamison, supra note 89.
91
See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 5, Kortlever v. Whatcom County, No. 2:18-CV-00823, 2018 WL
2763303 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2019) (requiring Whatcom County jails to allow continuation of MAT and
provide it for people who are not on MAT when arrested).
82
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which leaves ample discretion for prison officials to deny treatment.92 This
discretion may lead to an experience with treatment that is not evidence-based,
leaving an inmate with a lower tolerance for opioids and thus, more vulnerable
to overdose upon release.93
C. The Physical, Psychological, and Legal Effects of Withdrawal
Withdrawal occurs when a person with OUD reduces or completely stops
taking opioids.94 In the context of jails and prisons, it is considered forced
withdrawal. Because Methadone and Buprenorphine are opioids, withdrawal
occurs when an individual is forced off MAT as well.95 Withdrawal has serious
physical and psychological implications in the short term and the long term.96 In
the context of incarceration, the effects are exacerbated.97
Physically, individuals in withdrawal may experience “severe abdominal
cramping, nausea, [diarrhea], . . . and convulsions.”98 For many people with
OUD, “[w]ithdrawal is grueling and . . . a major reason for continued opioid
use.”99 In her lawsuit against Aroostook County, Ms. Smith described her
experience with forced withdrawal during a previous seven-day sentence as “the
worst pain she has ever endured.”100 Another woman stated that her seven-day
jail sentence and withdrawal was marked by dehydration because she did not
have the “energy to go to the water fountain” and her insomnia was “made worse
by the fluorescent lights that never turned off.”101 She relapsed within twentyfour hours of release.102 Consequences can be even more detrimental for

92
See Smith v. Aroostook County, 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 162 (D. Me. 2019) (order granting preliminary
injunction) (holding that defendants failed to make individualized assessments of inmates’ medical needs for
MAT); Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35, 47 (D. Mass 2018) (“[Defendants] have stood by the policy
without any indication that they would consider Pesce’s particular medical history and prescribed treatment in
considering whether departure from such policy might be warranted.”).
93
Beletsky et al., supra note 7, at 378 (describing the use of 12-Step programs and the fact that they are
not evidence-based treatment options).
94
Leah K. Walker, Opioid Withdrawal: Signs, Symptoms & Addiction Treatment, AM. ADDICTION CTRS.,
https://americanaddictioncenters.org/withdrawal-timelines-treatments/opiate (Mar. 9, 2022).
95
Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49.
96
Id. at 19.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Lopez, supra note 5.
100
Smith v. Aroostook County, 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 150 (D. Me. 2019) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
101
Morgan Godvin, I Thought Jail Would Help Me Get Clean. I Was Dead Wrong,, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Sept. 3, 2020, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/09/03/i-thought-jail-would-helpme-get-clean-i-was-dead-wrong.
102
Id.
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individuals with OUD who have co-morbidities or other mental health
concerns.103 Accidental death is a possible outcome of withdrawal in extreme
cases or in cases where the withdrawal process is not properly monitored.104
Given the substandard medical care in prisons and jails and the large volume of
inmates, improperly monitored withdrawal may be the norm.105
Withdrawal can produce a host of psychological effects as well, including
agitation, anxiety, or suicidal thoughts.106 Coupled with the prison experience,
which is marked by loneliness and a loss of autonomy, the risk of suicide
increases for inmates.107 These psychological effects can last up to thirty days
and are shown to significantly contribute to relapse.108 Additionally, some
scholars argue that the psychological distress of opioid withdrawal while
incarcerated may increase the risk of “self-incrimination, . . . victimization, and
susceptibility to coercion” for the most susceptible individuals in the criminal
justice system.109
In prison or jail, these effects continue even after withdrawal. When
individuals withdraw in prison, many will seek out alternative ways to continue
using opioids.110 The first concern with this illicit use is overdose because
withdrawal already reduces tolerance111 and “sporadic” drug availability means
individuals likely will not regain the same level of tolerance while in custody.112

103
Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49, at 19 (“[Withdrawal] can have serious medical consequences for
pregnant women and their [fetuses], immunocompromised people, and people suffering from comorbid medical
disorders.”).
104
Mann, supra note 75.
105
Madaline Pitkin died at age twenty-six in a jail in Oregon after she was arrested for heroin possession,
had told jail officials she had ingested heroin before her arrest, and was placed on a withdrawal plan. Maxine
Bernstein, Record $10 Million Judgment Awarded in Washington County Jail Heroin Withdrawal Death, THE
OREGONIAN (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2018/12/record-10-million-judgement-awardedagainst-corizon-health-in-death-of-washington-county-jail-inmate.html (“Long before [Madaline Pitkin’s]
death in custody, administrators and policymakers . . . were well aware that medical care at [their] jail was
subpar, understaffed[,] and those on staff were poorly trained . . . .”).
106
Mann, supra note 75.
107
Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49, at 19.
108
Connery, supra note 76, at 71.
109
Mann, supra note 75; see also Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49, at 19 (“Physical and psychological
symptoms attendant to withdrawal may impair capacity to make informed legal decisions, and heighten
vulnerability to succumb to police pressure to admit to false charges or confess guilt . . . .”).
110
Id. (“Studies in prisons throughout the world have shown that many prisoners continue injection while
incarcerated . . . .”).
111
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 50, at 4-13.
112
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Additionally, drug paraphernalia is limited in custody, which
makes syringe sharing necessary and common without a reliable maintenance dose from MAT. Bruce &
Schleifer, supra note 49, at 19. Unsafe practices in prisons and jails put opioid users at risk of HIV or hepatitis
C and strain already “limited medical resources.” Id.; Mann, supra note 75, at 240–41.
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Inevitably, illicit use while in custody creates a corresponding “increase in black
market demand for drugs,” which runs directly counter to the oft-cited
justification for banning MAT in jail—a desire to eliminate any risk of access to
a drug supply for inmates.113 By banning MAT, jails and prisons reinforce the
exact problem they hope to avoid. The cycle continues and individuals with
OUD are released, relapse, and are “back in jail within a month, then the month
after that.”114
Even supervised withdrawal is not considered adequate OUD treatment.115
At most, withdrawal is considered stabilization, “a first step toward recovery”
that is “most effective” with evidenced-based medicine.116 However, studies
show that fifty to seventy-five percent of individuals who undergo forced
withdrawal do not receive subsequent treatment that would help them achieve
long-term recovery.117 More is needed to address the individual’s brain
chemistry and prevent relapse. In a three-state study, twenty-seven percent of
people were readmitted within one year of completing withdrawal.118 Simply
put, not only is withdrawal painful and dangerous but it also does virtually
nothing to start recovery without the addition of MAT.
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: CASES CHALLENGING DENIAL OF MEDICATIONASSISTED TREATMENT IN PRISON
Cases challenging prohibition of MAT in prisons and the cruel consequences
discussed above are brought under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. An understanding of current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is necessary for the alternative framework discussed and applied
to post-release MAT in Part III. First, section A will discuss the Supreme Court’s
analyses in Estelle v. Gamble and Farmer v. Brennan to articulate the doctrinal
test for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Next,
section B will discuss Pesce v. Coppinger to explain both the application of the
Eighth Amendment to MAT cases and to highlight the limitations of both Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and ADA claims in this context.
113

Mann, supra note 75, at 240.
See, e.g., Godvin, supra note 101 (describing her failed detoxification in jail and decision to “resign
. . . to a life and death in heroin addiction” after selling her best friend the heroin that led to her overdose death);
see also SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 27 (“Within [three] months of release from custody, [seventy-five percent]
of formerly incarcerated individuals with an OUD relapse to opioid use, and approximately [forty to fifty
percent] are arrested for a new crime within the first year.”); supra notes 46–47.
115
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 50, at 4-12.
116
Id. at 4-13.
117
Id.
118
Id.
114
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A. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: Estelle, Farmer, and the Test for Future
Harm
In articulating the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stated that the
Amendment protects people involved in the criminal justice system in three
ways:
First, it limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those
convicted of crimes . . . ; second, it proscribes punishment grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime . . . ; and third, it imposes
substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished.119

Prison conditions generally, and medical care more specifically, may not breach
the limit on cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.120
The duty to provide medical care in prisons historically developed at
common law in recognition that once an individual is incarcerated and deprived
of their liberty, they are unable to provide for their own medical care, and the
state must do so instead.121 Eventually, in the 1976 case Estelle v. Gamble, the
Supreme Court extended the common law basis to create an affirmative duty by
“drastically expand[ing] the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause”
of the Eighth Amendment to apply to prison conditions.122 Farmer v. Brennan
expounded on the Estelle decision.123 Today, these two cases primarily govern
prison condition claims under the Eighth Amendment, including MAT cases.124
However, the precise contours of the duty to provide medical care remain
unclear, especially in the contexts of therapeutic treatment, the appropriate
standard of care, and post-release MAT.125
The Supreme Court first considered prison conditions in Estelle v. Gamble.
In Estelle, J.W. Gamble was working at a prison during his incarceration when
a bale of cotton fell on him, resulting in three months of continuous back pain,
during which he was seen by prison nurses and doctors on numerous
119
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976),
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371–73 (1910); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
120
Brenna Helppie-Schmieder, Toxic Confinement: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Prisoners from
Human-Made Environmental Health Hazards?, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 653–54 (2016); see infra note 132 and
accompanying text.
121
Richard Siever, HMOs Behind Bars: Constitutional Implications of Managed Health Care in the Prison
System, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (2005) (discussing Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291 (N.C. 1926)).
122
Sara L. Rose, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Need Not Be Cruel, Unusual, or Punishment, 24 CAP.
U. L. REV. 827, 828 (1995).
123
Id. at 839–40.
124
Id. at 857–58.
125
Siever, supra note 122, at 1377.

SCAVONE_6.15.22

2022]

6/21/2022 11:28 AM

BATTLEGROUND OF THE OPIOID CRISIS

1289

occasions.126 Each time, his only treatment was pain medication and some
variation of an order to rest.127 Eventually, his pain became so unbearable that
Gamble faced disciplinary measures for refusing to work, and his circumstances
forced him to file his original complaint.128
The extension of the Eighth Amendment in Estelle required recognition of
both the history and tradition of prohibiting solely “‘torture[s]’ and other
‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.”129 The Court explained that the Eighth
Amendment “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency.’”130 Reconciling these two concepts, the
Court reasoned that a failure to provide medical care may, at best, lead to pain
and suffering without “any penological purpose” and, at worst, “produce
physical ‘torture or a lingering death.’”131 Accordingly, the Court in Estelle held
that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment132 when they “are incompatible with ‘the evolving
standards of decency . . . of a maturing society’”133 or “involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.”134 Under Estelle, “the ‘unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment” occurs when a prison
official or doctor acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical
needs.135
Importantly, the Estelle Court qualified the duty to provide medical care by
declining to apply it to accidents and medical malpractice in the prison
context,136 implying that the deliberate indifference standard is only met when
prison officials act intentionally.137 The majority therefore articulated a
126

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98–99, 101 (1976).
Id. at 99–101.
128
Id. at 101.
129
Id. at 102 (alteration in original) (quoting Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969)).
130
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
131
Id. at 103.
132
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 691 (1977) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97).
133
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)).
134
Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
135
Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173). The deliberate indifference standard encompasses the
health and safety of inmates and has been considered broadly under the umbrella of “prison-conditions” cases,
as opposed to a narrower category of medical care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34 (1993)) (recognizing application of Eighth Amendment in instances of
faulty electrical wiring and insufficient fire safety and rejecting proposition that Eighth Amendment only applies
to deliberate indifference in the context of serious health problems).
136
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.
137
But see id. at 116–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“By its repeated references to ‘deliberate indifference’
and the ‘intentional’ denial of adequate medical care, . . . the Court improperly attaches significance to the
127
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subjective test that asks whether an official manifested indifference “in their
response to the inmate’s needs” or by “intentionally denying or delaying access
to medical care.”138 Applying this test, the majority held that there was no
violation of the Eighth Amendment because Gamble received medical attention
seventeen times, and the crux of his complaint was that failing to provide an Xray constituted insufficient medical treatment.139
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that a subjective analysis of individual
motivation is inappropriate, and the test should instead turn on an objective
analysis of the character of the punishment.140 Estelle established the foundation
for circuit courts to hold that prisons have an affirmative duty to protect inmates
and their safety.141 However, the Court did not clarify the definition or
appropriate outer limits of the term “deliberate indifference,” nor did it include
an objective component.
Eighteen years later, in Farmer v. Brennan, the Court affirmed and clarified
Estelle’s subjective test, added an objective component to the Eighth
Amendment analysis, and clarified the definition of “deliberate indifference,”142
which now governs MAT cases.143 Dee Farmer, a transsexual inmate, brought
suit against federal prison officials alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment
after she was beaten and raped in her cell.144 Farmer alleged an Eighth
Amendment claim on the basis that prison officials knew, or should have known,
that placing her in the general prison population would be dangerous to her

subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and unusual punishment has
been inflicted. . . . However, whether the constitutional standard has been violated should turn on the character
of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it.”).
138
Id. at 104–05.
139
Id. at 107.
140
Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote that a subjective determination of what
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment is incorrect, and that regardless of whether the conditions in Estelle
“were the product of design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cruel and inhuman.” Id. at 116–17.
141
Siever, supra note 122, at 1371 n.43; see, e.g., Elliot v. Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7, 10–11 (1st Cir.
1991) (establishing the duty of the jail to protect detainee from his suicidal tendencies, of which jail personnel
were aware or should have been aware); Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 459–60 (4th Cir. 1979) (establishing
the duty of the guard to protect prisoner from assault).
142
Courts of Appeals had inconsistently interpreted “deliberate indifference” to require anything from a
subjective standard of recklessness to actual or constructive knowledge. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994).
143
Mann, supra note 75, at 234. The Court distinguished prison condition cases from excessive force cases
in which inmates must prove officials “used force with ‘a knowing willingness that [harm] occur.’” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 835–36 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992)).
144
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830–31.
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because of her outwardly feminine characteristics and the “violent environment
and history of inmate assaults” at the institution.145
The Court articulated a two-pronged test for an Eighth Amendment prison
conditions claim that consists of both an objective and subjective component.146
First, the objective prong requires proof that the deprivation is “sufficiently
serious.”147 In a failure to prevent harm case, such as for failing to provide
sufficient medical treatment for OUD, “the inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”148
Importantly, the harm need not have occurred yet, nor must the substantial risk
uniformly affect all inmates.149 Eighth Amendment claims alleging future harm
are permitted, and the objective prong of the Farmer test is satisfied by proving
that (1) there is a likely risk of serious harm and (2) the serious harm is “so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly
to such a risk.”150 A synthesis of cases in the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
shows that to determine seriousness, courts consider “both the professional
judgment of the medical community and . . . the potential that a given condition
. . . will cause further harm.”151 Thus, the objective test can be undertaken in
both a qualitative and quantitative manner. The future harm analysis is crucial
for allegations of post-release overdose risks.
Second, the subjective prong established in Estelle requires that the inmate
prove deliberate indifference.152 The deliberate indifference prong is satisfied
145

Id. at 831.
Id. at 834.
147
Id. An analysis of “sufficiently serious” is complicated by the fact that “[p]rison conditions may be
‘restrictive and even harsh.’” Id. at 833. However, this does not mean that “prisoners can legally be made to
suffer from treatable medical or mental health disorders as part of their sentence.” David Lebowitz, “Proper
Subjects of Medical Treatment?” Addiction, Prison-Based Drug Treatment, and the Eighth Amendment, 14
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 271, 295 (2012).
148
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
149
Id. at 845 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)). In Helling v. McKinney, William
McKinney brought suit seeking injunctive relief on the basis that his exposure to environmental tobacco smoke
in prison “posed an unreasonable risk of harm to his future health” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 27–29. The Court equated the situation to more explicit examples of prison conditions, such
as “exposed electrical wiring . . . [and] deficient firefighting measures” and held that an Eighth Amendment
claim may be based on present or future harm since prison officials may not “ignore a condition of confinement
that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year.” Id. at
33–34. The risky conditions created by the environmental tobacco smoke “required a remedy,” even though the
harm was not immediate and did not affect all prisoners. Id. at 33.
150
Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. The prisoner’s risk of harm should be evaluated in light of the prison’s most
current policies. Id. This indicates there is room within the Eighth Amendment to consider a probable, yet
uncertain, risk of overdose.
151
Lebowitz, supra note 148, at 296.
152
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
146
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when an official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.”153 The Court upheld the subjective element of the test in Estelle because
the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, not “solely . . .
the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions”; therefore, the court
must evaluate “a prison official’s state of mind.”154 The subjective component
makes it more difficult for an inmate to state an Eighth Amendment claim
because prison officials can refute the claim by proving they were unaware of
the risk or that they responded reasonably.155
Adding to an inmate’s difficulty in stating a claim, Farmer’s subjective
prong explicitly rejects constructive knowledge as a basis for liability under the
Eighth Amendment.156 Actual knowledge, on the other hand, is a question of
fact for the jury, and the inmate may rely on circumstantial evidence.157
Accordingly, an inmate’s failure to give advance notice of the perceived harm
to prison officials is not dispositive.158 In the case of future harm where a
petitioner seeks injunctive relief, deliberate indifference is “determined in light
of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and conduct.”159
Thus, to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim of future harm, such as the
risk of overdose in a MAT case,160 the petitioner must adequately show both that
“prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference[,] exposed a prisoner to a
sufficiently substantial [objective] ‘risk of serious damage to his future
health’”161 such that his punishment is “grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime.”162 Notably, the Supreme Court has diverged on what exactly
constitutes “punishment,” and whether a finding that a particular prison
condition is punishment should turn on the subjective mental state of prison

153

Id. at 837.
Id. at 838 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299–302 (1991)). But see id. at 858 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“I continue to believe that a state official may inflict cruel and unusual punishment without any
improper subjective motivation . . . .”).
155
Id. at 829, 844. Farmer’s dicta is even more deferential, suggesting that if a prison official “knew the
underlying facts but believed . . . that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent,” then
a jury may choose not to infer knowledge of the risk on behalf of the official. Id. at 844.
156
Id. at 842.
157
Id. at 842–43. For example, the Court suggested that evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate
attacks was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past” was
enough for the jury to find actual knowledge of the risk on behalf of the prison officials. Id. at 842.
158
Id. at 848.
159
Id. at 845 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993)).
160
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 187–88.
161
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 35).
162
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371–73
(1910)).
154
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officials.163 This disagreement is central to the difficulty of defining the outer
bounds of an Eighth Amendment claim and determining when relief is
appropriate.
Despite disagreement among the Court’s Justices, the lower courts originally
analyzed prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment, as Justice Brennan
noted in his Rhodes v. Chapman concurrence, often finding “entire prison
systems” unconstitutional.164 Although the Court cautioned deference, Justice
Brennan emphasized that “judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional
dictates . . . [and] considerations of basic humanity . . . are to be observed in the
prisons.”165 Citing the horrendous conditions that lower courts have investigated
and repudiated, Justice Brennan synthesized the analysis as one in which a court
looks at the totality of the circumstances of a prison’s conditions and evaluates
them in terms of “contemporary standards of decency.”166 Ultimately, Justice
Brennan concluded that conditions violate the Eighth Amendment when “the
cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the physical,
mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates [and] creates a
probability of recidivism and future incarceration.”167
This cumulative impact analysis summarizes the sweeping effort of the
lower courts to improve prison conditions, despite the Supreme Court’s rigid
interpretation of “punishment” and a subjective requirement for the Eighth
Amendment.168 In part, the more liberal approach taken by lower courts explains
the difficulty in identifying the contours of the Eighth Amendment as it applies
to prison conditions.169 However, it simultaneously leaves open the possibility
that lower courts may be more open to requiring prisons to provide MAT to
163
See supra note 141 and accompanying text; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“I agree with Justice Stevens that inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment even if no prison
official has an improper, subjective state of mind.”).
164
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
prisons or prison systems in twenty-four states have been found unconstitutional and stating that “[t]here is no
reason of comity, judicial restraint, or recognition of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omissions of
officials who lack the resources or motivation to operate prisons within limits of decency”).
165
Id. at 349; see id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). This quote is taken out of context
and is not meant to suggest a judicial usurpation of the legislative branch. Justice Brennan clarified that “[n]o
one familiar with litigation in this area could suggest that the courts have been overeager to usurp the task of
running prisons, which . . . is entrusted to . . . the ‘legislature.’” Id. at 354 (citation omitted). Instead, Justice
Brennan asserted that the abhorrent prison conditions brought to light in Eighth Amendment cases have “been
thrust upon the judicial conscience.” Id. (quoting Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail v. Eisenstandt, 360 F. Supp. 676,
684 (D. Mass. 1973)).
166
Id. at 363–64 (citation omitted).
167
Id. at 364 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).
168
Id. at 363–64.
169
See infra Part II.B.
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released inmates.170 Though there has not been a Supreme Court case declaring
a constitutional right to continue MAT in prison, federal district court decisions
from 2018 and 2019 indicate a recent and growing acceptance for the argument
that MAT must be provided in prison under the Eighth Amendment.171 Before
these district court cases, many scholars advocated for Eighth Amendment
application to treatment of OUD in prisons.172 Today, commentators advocate
for extending the holding in Pesce v. Coppinger to inmates who want to opt in
to MAT treatment when they initially enter the criminal justice system.173
Despite more liberal treatment by the lower courts, as shown below, current
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence still falls short of getting inmates the OUD
treatment they need.
B. Pesce v. Coppinger Indicates the Eighth Amendment Mandates the
Provision of MAT
Because advocates have only recently managed to secure MAT in prisons
for certain inmates, a discussion of the limited case law is necessary. The
reasoning in Pesce v. Coppinger and the alternative Eighth Amendment
framework presented in Part III form the basis for extending Eighth Amendment
claims to the post-release provision of MAT. Accordingly, this section discusses
the recent district court case Pesce v. Coppinger, which granted injunctive relief
for a man facing incarceration in a jail with an anti-MAT policy.174 This section
also details the growing recognition that prisons should both allow new inmates
to continue their preexisting MAT use and offer it to inmates with OUD who
have not previously been on medication. Finally, this section highlights the
limitations of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the context of MAT, as well
as the limitations the ADA imposes.

170

See infra Part II.B.
CTR. FOR U.S. POL’Y, MAT FOR INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS: CASE LAW UPDATE 1, 1–5 (2020),
https://centerforuspolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/MAT-for-Incarcerated-Individuals-Case-LawUpdate.pdf.
172
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 189.
173
Mann, supra note 75, at 243 (“The hope is that the ADA protections continue to be construed and
expanded in favor of inclusivity, granting access to addiction treatment for any inmate who desires to start on
the road to recovery.”).
174
Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35, 49 (D. Mass. 2018).
171
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1. Analysis of Pesce v. Coppinger and the Limitation of MAT Litigation
Holdings
In 2018,175 Geoffrey Pesce brought suit seeking emergency injunctive relief
against the Essex County House of Corrections in response to its policy that
uniformly denies continuation of an inmate’s MAT while they are in custody.176
Pesce was arrested and charged with driving six miles over the speed limit with
a revoked license while driving himself to receive Methadone treatment because
he was desperate not to relapse.177 The offense carries a “mandatory minimum
sentence of [sixty] days’ incarceration,” during which Pesce would have to stop
taking his MAT and subsequently suffer forced withdrawal.178 The U.S. District
Court of the District of Massachusetts considered Pesce’s Eighth Amendment
and ADA claims.179 Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the court
determined Pesce was “likely to succeed on the merits of his ADA claim”
because the prison’s withdrawal policy had been “documented . . . as
ineffective.”180
More importantly, the district court determined Pesce would likely prevail
on his Eighth Amendment claim based on the objective and subjective prongs
because his particular medical history showed the prison’s treatment policy
would most likely be ineffective for him, and because the prison directly ignored
his doctor’s treatment recommendation to continue with MAT.181 First, the court
concluded that Mr. Pesce satisfied the objective prong because his past failed

175
Similar holdings are not currently widespread in other circuits, but Pesce is nonetheless noteworthy
given that as recently as 2012, “it [was] unlikely that any court in the status quo would hold an official liable for
damages for failure to provide drug treatment, given the paucity of legal precedents supporting drug treatment
as a constitutional right.” Lebowitz, supra note 148, at 295 n.129. Today, the Eighth Amendment argument as
it concerns MAT is gaining traction in federal courts in the states of Kansas, Massachusetts, and Washington.
Mann, supra note 75, at 239 n.60 (citing four cases in which courts have granted continued access to MAT in
prison for prisoners who had begun treatment before incarceration).
176
Complaint, supra note 7, at 16.
177
Id. at 3.
178
Id. The policy in Pesce is illustrative of policies in many other prisons and jails. Mann, supra note 75,
at 232. Here, MAT is not available to male inmates with OUD, regardless of whether they have a previous
prescription before their arrest. Id. The only class of prisoners eligible to receive MAT are pregnant women.
Pesce Complaint, supra note 7, at 8; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
179
Pesce, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 47.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 47–48. Although Pesce v. Coppinger does not cite Farmer v. Brennan for the two-pronged test,
the articulation and application is essentially the same as in Farmer in that the objective prong requires a
sufficiently serious medical need and the subjective prong requires “intent or wanton disregard.” Id. at 47 (citing
Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F. 3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002); Perry v. Roy, 782 F. 3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015)).
Although Farmer uses the term “deliberate indifference,” the phrase “intent or wanton disregard” is applied the
same way here. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
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attempts at recovery without MAT proved the jail’s prohibition of Methadone
would deny him his “only adequate treatment.”182 The court reasoned that
forcing Pesce into a detoxification treatment identical to his previous
unsuccessful attempts would put him at a high risk of relapse.183 In short, the
court relied on the same reasoning to satisfy both the ADA claim and the
objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test.184
Second, in the analysis of the deliberate indifference prong, the court noted
that Pesce’s doctor and others familiar with his medical needs recommended that
he continue taking Methadone. In conclusion, the court stated that denying
medical professionals’ recommendations “may be sufficient to satisfy the
deliberate indifference standard.”185 Although that was the extent of the
deliberate indifference discussion, the court did seem to acknowledge the
subjective knowledge requirement by indicating that prison officials knew of
Pesce’s doctor’s recommendation but chose to actively ignore it.186 This
indicates that intent was still necessary for the holding. Additionally, the court
cited Pesce’s past attempts at treatment, numerous overdoses, and general
overdose statistics to conclude that denying Methadone created a “reasonable
likelihood of irreparable harm” for purposes of a preliminary injunction
analysis.187
While a fairly straightforward case in terms of Eighth Amendment analysis,
Pesce is novel in that it appears to be the first case to successfully prevail on an
Eighth Amendment claim based on a prison’s MAT withdrawal policy.188 Pesce
is also noteworthy because it has been a useful resource on which other
advocates have based their legal arguments.189 Further, with some changes to

182

Pesce, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 47.
Id. at 45–46.
184
Id. at 45.
185
Id. at 48.
186
Id. (citing Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F. Supp. 2d 486, 493 (D. Mass. 2012) for the proposition that
“prison officials repeatedly ignor[ing] [a] physician’s recommendations . . . establish[es] an Eighth Amendment
violation”).
187
Id. The statistics the court cites in support of Pesce’s claim of irreparable harm are noteworthy because
they show that the court is willing to consider a statistical analysis. Additionally, they are exactly the kind of
statistics useful in proving a case for post-release provision of MAT, such as the finding that “nearly [fifty
percent] of all deaths among those released from incarceration were opioid-related.” Id. Especially in the case
of future harm, these statistics are invaluable and compelling to illustrate the severity of the problem and the role
of incarceration.
188
See ANITA MARTON & GABRIELLE DE LA GUÉRONNIÈRE, RECENT COURT ACTIONS IMPACTING THE
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER FIELD 1, 4 (2019), https://nasadad.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/6.6.19-RecentCourt-Actions-Impacting-SUD-Field.pdf (detailing five successful challenges to denial of MAT).
189
Id. at 25.
183
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the same logic in Pesce also applies to MAT
post-release.
2. ADA Claims as an Alternative to the Eighth Amendment and Limitations
of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence in the MAT Context
While Pesce has been a useful tool for advocates, other courts that have
granted preliminary injunctions to petitioners have done so based on the ADA
and have declined to consider the Eighth Amendment claims.190 Pesce itself
seems to blur the line between the two claims.191 Without a change to Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and a provision of MAT post-release, people will
continue to overdose and die.
ADA claims may be a less risky option for petitioners like Pesce, but, as
discussed below, avoiding a more robust discussion of the Eighth Amendment
means that holdings in MAT cases cannot positively impact inmates who do not
qualify as disabled for purposes of ADA protection. The Pesce court may have
been more willing to address the Eighth Amendment claim because in granting
a preliminary injunction it only had to consider the “likelihood of success on the
merits.”192 However, the more likely explanation for the petitioners’ success is
that because Pesce was taking MAT before he was incarcerated, he was
classified as “in recovery,” and thus protected by the ADA.193 It is easy to see
why a judge would rather apply the ADA, given the fairly logical conclusion
that denying a “recovering” inmate’s treatment plan runs counter to both the
spirit and letter of the law.194 Additionally, four other cases that alleged ADA
and Eighth Amendment claims have all settled, which makes it difficult to
determine precisely which legal arguments would have been successful,
190
See Smith v. Aroostook County, 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 161 (D. Me. 2019) (“Because I find that the
Plaintiff’s ADA claim is likely to succeed . . . I do not address the Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on her Eighth
Amendment claim.”), aff’d, 922 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2019); see also What Is the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK, https://adata.org/learn-about-ada (May 2022) [hereinafter What Is the ADA]
(“The ADA is a civil rights law that prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of
public life, including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and private places that are open to the general
public. The purpose of the law is to make sure that people with disabilities have the same rights and opportunities
as everyone else.”).
191
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
192
Pesce, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (emphasis added).
193
Mann, supra note 75, at 236–37 (“Based on current interpretations, the Eighth Amendment alone is not
enough to ensure that jails and prisons are required to provide access to MAT for recovering opioid addicts.”).
The ADA National Network states that “[t]he ADA protects a person in recovery who is no longer currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs.” What Is the ADA, supra note 191. Additionally, according to the ADA
National Network, a person “in recovery” has “ceased engaging in the illegal use of drugs” and is “either . . . in
a supervised rehabilitation program; or has been successfully rehabilitated.” Id.
194
See What Is the ADA, supra note 191.
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although each of the four petitioners was already prescribed and taking MAT
before their lawsuits were filed.195 The impact on Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence appears minimal.
More problematic is that the cases with narrow holdings, as well as
settlements, show the limits of the Eighth Amendment in the context of MAT—
the cases do nothing more than provide immediate relief for a specific petitioner
or class of petitioners, which makes policy changes, such as requiring MAT
availability for all eligible inmates despite prior treatment, unlikely.196 In other
words, these narrow agreements are insufficient, are “not expected to change
[prison] policy,” and do not guarantee that “others [will not] endure the
same . . . situations.”197 While the holdings may easily extend to similar
plaintiffs, critics point out that uncertainty shrouds ADA claims deviating from
the Pesce fact pattern.198 Currently, it is uncertain whether, under the ADA, a
prison would have to provide MAT for an inmate with a prescription who
continues to use illegal drugs, or an inmate who clearly suffers from OUD, but
did not have a prescription before incarceration.199 Adding to the confusion,
despite the ADA’s limited protection,200 “the law also says that even current
users can’t be denied health care.”201 Time spent litigating the meaning of the
ADA ignores the real issue that, in the meantime, countless people in U.S.
prisons and jails will face an almost insurmountably high risk of death, both
195
Settlement Agreement at 2, Dipierro v. Hurwitz, C.A. No. 1:19-CV-10495-WGY (2019) (requiring
defendants to administer Ms. DiPierro’s Methadone treatment while she is incarcerated); DOC Will Provide
Doctor-Prescribed Medication to Prisoner with Opioid Use Disorder, ACLU OF ME. (Sept. 28, 2019),
https://www.aclumaine.org/en/press-releases/doc-will-provide-doctor-prescribed-medication-prisoner-opioiduse-disorder (“While the case [of Zachary Smith] did not reach a decision on the constitutional and ADA charges,
the ACLU says the settlement will make it harder for other corrections facilities to argue that providing MAT to
prisoners isn’t possible.”); Press Release, ACLU Washington, Whatcom County Jail to Provide Medications
Necessary to Treat Opioid Addiction in Landmark Settlement Proposed in Civil Rights Lawsuit (Apr. 30, 2019)
(available at https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/whatcom-county-jail-provide-medications-necessary-treat-opioidaddiction-landmark-settlement) (describing settlement agreement in class action requiring provision of MAT in
Whatcom County Jail regardless of whether treatment began prior to incarceration and noting “facilities have
begun to change their policies to provide MAT” for fear of “violating the ADA”); Sandra E. Garcia, Kansas
Inmate Will Be Allowed Opioid Addiction Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/us/
kansas-aclu-inmate-opioids.html (detailing settlement for plaintiff Leaman Crews requiring Leavenworth
federal penitentiary to provide his Buprenorphine and noting the settlement “appl[ies] narrowly to Mr. Crews’s
case”).
196
The exception is the Whatcom County class action settlement agreement in which the county jail agreed
to a complete overhaul of its MAT policies. See supra note 91.
197
Garcia, supra note 196.
198
Schwartzapfel, supra note 22.
199
Id.
200
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
201
Schwartzapfel, supra note 22.
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during and after incarceration.202 This death toll could be significantly mitigated
with a clearer holding based on the Eighth Amendment.203
Since Pesce, advocates have argued for an extension of its holding, such that
“MAT could and should be granted to inmates in jails and prisons nationwide”
if they elect OUD treatment.204 Admittedly, although Pesce established the
framework and increased the odds of a favorable ruling for MAT users in Eighth
Amendment cases,205 there is no acknowledged requirement for premium health
care services.206 Accordingly, “[c]ourts appear more inclined to dismiss claims
where some service is provided.”207 As noted previously, however, thirty-five of
the fifty states either do not provide MAT or limit services to the short-term
Naltrexone shot upon release;208 therefore, there is a dire need to expand access
to MAT in a way that the current holdings cannot.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE: THE STATE’S CARCERAL BARGAIN AND A CORRESPONDING
STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD
If prison conditions that result in death cannot be deemed unconstitutional
without the help of a corresponding ADA claim, then the Eighth Amendment
right is not fully realized under current jurisprudence.209 Furthermore, the
subjective analysis from Farmer misunderstands the nature and extent of the
state’s obligation under the Eighth Amendment and allows the state to inflict
cruel and unusual punishment. First, section A discusses how Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is the cause of such limited MAT holdings and
suggests an alternative framework centered on an objective, rather than
202

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
204
Mann, supra note 75, at 234.
205
Schwartzapfel, supra note 22 (“So far these rulings have been narrow, pertaining only to the individuals
who sued. But ‘every time a prison or jail agrees that they’re going to do this, it makes it harder for other prisons
or jails to say it’s impossible.’” (quoting Zachary Heiden, the ACLU attorney who worked on the suits in
Maine)).
206
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 191.
207
Id. Given the prevalence of a preference for nonscientific treatment options in many states, such as
abstinence treatment and 12-Step programs, it remains unclear how much deference a court will give to an
“individualized determination” that one of these alternatives to MAT is suitable. See Beletsky, supra note 7, at
378 (analyzing spending under the 21st Century Cures Act and finding “states hardest-hit by overdose crisis . . .
are using the most sizable portions of . . . funding” for non-evidence-based initiatives despite Act’s intentions).
Importantly, these “alternatives” are “not rooted in evidence of addressing identifiable overdose morbidity or
mortality endpoints.” Id. at 378, 381.
208
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
209
This Comment does not suggest that such a holding is impossible under the current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, only that case law shows that it is an unlikely outcome that courts are hesitant to reach.
203
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subjective, analysis. Next, section B will discuss a heightened negligence
standard for prison officials that asks whether a reasonable prison official would
have known of the risk of harm. Knowledge is irrebuttably presumed for systemwide failures. Section C then applies this alternative framework to Pesce. Each
analysis also outlines the claims and doctrinal tests in the context of future harm,
since the deprivation of MAT and disruption of treatment necessarily creates the
risk of overdose at an indeterminate point in the future, in addition to inmates’
immediate suffering during withdrawal.210 Section D discusses why intervening
causation does not defeat the argument for mandating MAT post-release.
Finally, section E distinguishes MAT from other rehabilitation services and
clarifies that the Eighth Amendment should only be applied post-release when
the cause of the harm is directly linked to a micro- or macro-level failure of the
prison administration.
A. The State’s Carceral Bargain Makes Prison Conditions Part of Eighth
Amendment Punishment
Sharon Dolovich, Director of the UCLA Prison Law & Policy Program,211
acknowledges the limited reach of current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
attributes it to a misconception about the extent of the state’s duty to inmates, as
well as what exactly constitutes “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.212
This section first defines the state’s “carceral bargain.” It then details how prison
conditions are always part of the state’s bargain, and thus always constrained by
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.213 Finally, this section
critiques Farmer’s deliberate indifference standard and then presents an
alternative framework—a heightened negligence standard with an irrebuttable
presumption of prison officials’ knowledge in certain situations.214 While
Dolovich’s work focuses on claims for current inmates, the remainder of this
Comment will extend heightened negligence to the post-incarceration provision
of MAT.215 If the Eighth Amendment is not applied to post-incarceration MAT,
former inmates will continue to overdose at a staggering rate because of the
unconstitutional lack of treatment.216

210

See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
Sharon Dolovich, UCLA L. (2021), https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/sharon-dolovich (last
visited May 3, 2022) (Professor profile page).
212
Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 882–
90 (2009).
213
See infra notes 219, 228–29.
214
See infra notes 232–46.
215
See infra Part III.C.
216
See supra notes 2–5.
211
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As a matter of common law tradition, society’s choice to punish people with
incarceration “allows [it] to remove certain individuals from a shared public
space,” thereby making inmates “wholly dependent on the state . . . and deeply
vulnerable.”217 The choice to incarcerate gives rise to a corresponding
obligation: an affirmative, ongoing duty for the state to “maintain[] prisoners’
physical and psychological integrity and well-being.”218 This ongoing obligation
is “society’s carceral bargain,”219 which the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment makes “nonnegotiable”220 so long as society
punishes with incarceration.221 Though inmates may justifiably endure
deprivation, the state fails to fulfill its obligation and inflicts cruel and unusual
punishment when, as in Farmer,222 the prisoner suffers “serious harm” or a
“substantial risk of serious harm.”223 Thus, the carceral bargain is a direct result
of the decision to incarcerate and invariably operates in the background at any
point in the criminal justice system.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is
“exclusively concerned” with “state punishment,”224 which includes prison
conditions by virtue of its administration.225 State punishment can only be
inflicted as “the result of a collective process” in which “state officials . . . derive
their power from . . . linked institutions—the legislature, police, prosecutors,
courts, and prisons.”226 This collective process results in state-sanctioned
incarceration as a means of enforcing a judicially determined penalty, which
prison officials, under state authority and legitimacy, then administer by
“creat[ing] the conditions under which a prisoner will live.”227 These conditions,
217

Dolovich, supra note 212, at 892, 913.
Id. at 921.
219
It is a “bargain” because incarceration is a “public good” that “entails the investment of considerable
resources.” Id. at 923. Importantly, by connecting the carceral bargain directly to the Eighth Amendment, this
definition resists the argument that the state’s obligation is “simply a moral imperative,” as opposed to a
constitutional one. Id. at 914.
220
See supra note 218 and accompanying text; see also Dolovich, supra note 212, at 923 (explaining that
there is a “minimum cost that must be borne” by the state because of the choice to punish with incarceration).
221
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 892.
222
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
223
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 918. The length of the sentence “reflect[s] society’s collective judgment
as to the seriousness of the crime”; accordingly, prison officials cannot inflict additional punishment because of
a “private judgment[] of moral desert.” Id. at 920.
224
Id. at 897.
225
Id. at 898.
226
Id. Importantly, to act on and fulfill its carceral bargain collectively, the state necessarily delegates
“considerable power and discretion” to agencies and prison staff. Id. at 929. Accordingly, part of the state’s
carceral bargain is to ensure “any prison official[] . . . ha[s] the capacity and tendency to exercise their authority
in ways consistent with the state’s affirmative obligations to its prisoners.” Id. at 930.
227
Id. at 899.
218
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and any treatment to which the prisoner is subject, are “the punishment the state
has imposed” such that “the severity of the punishment ultimately depends on
the conditions of confinement.”228 Therefore, whether an action is punishment
is determined not by an intent to harm229 but by “whether prisoners’ suffering is
traceable to state-created conditions of confinement.”230 By this logic, “all the
conditions to which an offender is subjected at the hands of state officials . . .
are appropriately open to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.”231
Accordingly, under this more expansive interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment,232 Farmer’s actual knowledge requirement for a finding of
deliberate indifference is “premised on a narrow, individualistic conception of
punishment” inapposite to the state’s carceral bargain.233 A subjective standard
of actual knowledge applied to the individual officers misunderstands both the
Eighth Amendment and the state’s carceral bargain. First, because the Eighth
Amendment restricts state punishment, as explained above, a focus on the prison
official’s knowledge of the serious harm or substantial risk of serious harm
misapplies the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to the individual
and fails to recognize that they act on behalf of the state.234 Second, and
relatedly, because the state bears the carceral bargain while administering
punishment through a complex array of delegation, the subjective standard
ignores the fact that the duty to protect prisoners from serious harm is present at

228

Id. at 899, 913.
Id. at 930 (“It is enough to show that the institution, through the combined actions of the various
officials charged with its functioning, created a set of conditions—manifested most directly by the inflicting
officer—that caused prisoners serious harm.”).
230
Id. at 897. Dolovich clarifies that the goals of punishment—“to chastise and deter”—are still present in
this more expansive definition because incarceration is “judicially determined” to be the appropriate
consequence of the crime. Id. at 899–900 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)).
231
Id. at 899.
232
Dolovich addresses and refutes two narrower interpretations of what constitutes punishment. Id. at 900.
First, the “strictural view” completely rejects prison conditions as punishment and limits the term strictly to “the
sentence imposed by ‘judges or juries.’” Id. Not only is the view untenable, but it is also logically difficult to
exclude all prison conditions from the term “punishment” when they are “a necessary feature of the penalty”
once the prisoner is sentenced. Id. Additionally, the “governmentalist account” recognizes the state’s ongoing
obligation to prisoners but only classifies prison conditions as “punishment . . . when they arise from official
action duly authorized by the state.” Id. at 901–02. Like the strictural view, the governmentalist approach
embraces an “inappropriately individualistic notion of punishment” that fails to “appreciate the state’s
responsibility for all official conduct that impacts prisoners.” Id. at 902, 905. Instead, the appropriate analysis
recognizes that society’s choice to incarcerate results in delegation to a myriad of state agents, prison
administrators, and correctional officers who only act “because the state has placed them in a position of
authority and has given them considerable power to shape prisoners’ conditions of confinement,” regardless of
whether those actions are state-authorized. Id. at 905.
233
Id. at 897.
234
See supra notes 224–28 and accompanying text.
229
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every stage of punishment.235 Prison conditions and prison officials’ conduct
cannot be separated from punishment, and thus are always governed by the
affirmative carceral bargain on one hand, and the prohibitive Eighth
Amendment, on the other.236 The state’s duty never goes away.237
Not only is Farmer’s subjective test problematic in terms of the Eighth
Amendment and the carceral bargain, but it also gives prison officials a perverse
incentive to completely shirk the portion of the carceral bargain delegated to
them238—a micro-level failure.239 Instead of recognizing prison officials’
affirmative duties to “monitor, investigate, discover, and avert potential
problems,” the actual knowledge requirement creates an “episodic” duty that
“[arises] only when [officials] happen to notice possible threats to prisoners’
well-being.”240 In turn, officials are incentivized “not to be proactive [and] not
to look.”241 The Farmer standard allows complicity within the entire criminal
justice system and lets officials avoid liability so long as they can claim
ignorance.242 This is exactly the type of cruel and unusual punishment that
should be barred by the state’s carceral bargain.243
At the same time, willful ignorance on behalf of prison officials would not
be possible without an institution that is complicit with, if not encouraging of,
such behavior. Therefore, the state inflicts cruel and unusual punishment when,
“in a structural sense,” a prison system reflects indifference by design in that it
“systematically subjects some subset of the population to needless and avoidable
suffering.”244 Eighth Amendment violations on behalf of individual officers are
possible because they are allowed by the state-created system. Farmer’s
subjective test enables a failure of the carceral bargain on both the individual
and state level and, in doing so, allows the continued infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment.245 Thus, an objective standard with an irrebuttable
235
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 905. This duty applies to “all official conduct that impacts prisoners,”
regardless of whether that conduct is “beyond the scope of . . . delegation.” Id.
236
See supra notes 224–28 and accompanying text.
237
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 903 (“State power, once delegated, cannot be so easily cabined.”).
238
Id. at 945–46 (“The inadequacies of Farmer’s standard reverberate throughout the institution,
encouraging officials at all levels to take insufficient steps to guard against serious harm.”).
239
Id. at 946; see infra note 249 and accompanying text.
240
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 945.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 947.
243
Id.
244
Id. at 926.
245
Id. at 945–48. Though focusing on the state’s responsibility, this framing does not conflict with the
Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition on “suits in federal courts against state governments in law [or] equity . . .
by citizens of another state.” Id. at 937 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
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presumption of constructive knowledge is necessary to fully encompass the
scope of the bargain and remedy the inadequacies of current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.246
Implementing this objective standard either via a heightened negligence
standard or a modified strict liability standard could sufficiently bring prison
conditions in compliance with the Eighth Amendment.247 Although both
standards are a compelling alternative, this Comment will discuss and apply the
heightened negligence standard, both because it is a slightly more feasible
alternative to current jurisprudence and because it illustrates the likelihood of
success on a petitioner’s MAT case under a more stringent burden than modified
strict liability.
B. The Heightened Negligence Standard and Irrebuttable Presumption of
Constructive Knowledge
The heightened negligence standard is an extrapolation of Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Estelle v. Gamble and asks “whether plaintiffs were subjected to a
substantial risk of serious harm of which a reasonably attentive prison official
would have known.”248 Implicit in Justice Stevens’s dissent is “a different
doctrinal approach” for claims of macro- and micro-level failures.249 Macrolevel failures occur because of “system-wide failures . . . through generally
applicable conditions,” whereas micro-level failures “arise from the conduct of
individual prison officials toward individual prisoners.”250 For macro-level
failure claims, “official knowledge of the risk ought to be ‘irrebuttably
presumed’” because, where a substantial risk of harm exists at the macro-level,
a designated prison official “will necessarily have been responsible for that
aspect of the prison’s operations” and thus, should have known about the
harmful conditions.251

POLICIES 180 (3d ed. 2006)). Instead, allegations of cruel and unusual punishment can still be brought against
the individual officer under Section 1983 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. However, the distinction between
macro- and micro-level failures still stands, despite the fact that an action is brought against the individual, not
the state. While the action is “an allegation of institutional cruelty,” it “happens to be manifested most
immediately by the inflicting officer” who is necessary to carry out the state’s punishment. Id. at 937–39.
246
Id. at 948.
247
Id. at 936.
248
Id. at 948.
249
Id. at 950. Because the MAT prison cases addressed in this Comment focus on MAT policies as a
whole, this Comment will not detail the entire analysis of micro-level failures.
250
Id. at 946.
251
Id. at 950–52.
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Justice Stevens’s dissent in Estelle v. Gamble illustrates the distinction
between micro- and macro-level analyses. In Estelle, J.W. Gamble, who suffered
through three months of extreme back pain, was repeatedly given pain
medication and ordered to rest without further examination of his condition.252
The majority analyzed Estelle through a micro-level lens and rejected liability
on the basis that none of Gamble’s seventeen interactions with medical staff at
the prison amounted to substantial harm.253
In contrast, Stevens’s dissent implies that when seventeen interactions with
prison officials fail to identify “an obvious need for remedial treatment,” the
harm is a result of “a connected set of macro-level failures in the operation of
the prison’s medical system.”254 In short, the individual is culpable for failing to
fulfill that particular duty, but they could not be culpable without the
simultaneous failure and culpability of the state—the creation of “such a plainly
deficient system” with “too few staff members[,] . . . too many prisoners,”
incompetent officials, and inadequate facilities.255 Here, constructive knowledge
is appropriate because the state appoints officials precisely to implement a
medical system within the prison. Therefore, that person “should have known
about [the] conditions” and the corresponding serious harm or the risk of serious
harm.256 Additionally, courts should not analyze officials’ alleged justification
for the conduct because “serious physical or psychological harm is never
justified.”257
In practice, the analysis of what constitutes a substantial risk of serious harm
stays the same. The main difference from Farmer is that by abandoning a
subjective knowledge approach, courts are not required to ignore the systematic
failings at work behind individual culpability. Instead, even if the individual
officer is merely negligent, a big picture analysis centered on constructive
knowledge allows a finding that the Eighth Amendment has been violated.
Courts simply must find (1) a macro-level system failure that a prison official
with delegated state power oversaw, and (2) a substantial risk of serious harm as
a result of the failure.258 Instead of inappropriately expanding the Eighth
Amendment, heightened negligence merely recognizes that a state-centered

252

See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 950.
254
Id. at 950–51.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 952.
257
Id. at 957. Foreclosing an argument for justification is consistent with the preexisting Farmer test and,
therefore, is nothing novel. Id.
258
Id. at 950–52.
253
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analysis is more appropriate. Without such recognition of systematic failures of
the state’s carceral bargain, the Eighth Amendment’s full purpose is not
recognized.
Thus, an “irrebuttably presumed” constructive knowledge standard in the
case of serious harm, or the risk of serious harm, addresses many of the Eighth
Amendment shortcomings in the MAT context, discussed in the analysis of
Pesce v. Coppinger.259 Section C first applies heightened negligence and
constructive knowledge to Pesce v. Coppinger to illustrate the feasibility and
practicability of applying it to MAT cases. Second, the expanded definition of
punishment and the facts in Pesce v. Coppinger are used to illustrate why
extending the Eighth Amendment to the post-release provision of MAT is
appropriate.
C. The Framework in Practice: Applying Heightened Negligence to Pesce v.
Coppinger
This section applies the heightened negligence framework to the facts of
Pesce v. Coppinger to illustrate how it allows for a broader holding focused on
the prison system, instead of a narrow ADA-based holding that only protects
prisoners previously prescribed MAT and not using any other illegal substance.
First, this section will explain why the prison policy meets the state-centered
definition of punishment. Next, this section will explain why the prison policy
is a macro-level failure that warrants an irrebuttable presumption of constructive
knowledge. Finally, this section will explore possible outcomes of a lawsuit
brought under the new framework. Analyzing Pesce v. Coppinger is important
because once MAT is discussed as a systematic, macro-level failure of prisons
and jails, applying the framework to post-release provision of MAT is a natural
extension based on the definition of punishment and use of constructive
knowledge.
Punishment includes a prisoner’s confinement or treatment that is “traceable
to state-created conditions of confinement.”260 In Pesce v. Coppinger, the forced
withdrawal policy is clearly state created because prison officials determined it
was the best treatment for OUD in their facility.261 Withdrawal is the only OUD

259

Dolovich, supra note 212, at 964.
Id. at 897; see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
261
Defendants Kevin F. Coppinger & Aaron Eastman’s Memorandum of Law in Support of their
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 5, Pesce v.
Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 18-CV-11972) [hereinafter Coppinger Memorandum]; see
supra note 254 and accompanying text.
260
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treatment that prison officials have approved, with a narrow exception for
pregnant women.262 Thus, the side effects of withdrawal that prisoners face—
“severe abdominal cramping, nausea, [diarrhea], . . . convulsions,”263 agitation,
anxiety, and suicidal thoughts264—are unavoidable state-created conditions that
are considered punishment.265 The Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly
disproportionate punishment.266 Sentences cannot legitimately subject prisoners
to the serious physical and psychological distress associated with withdrawal
because it is cruel, disproportionate, and not judicially determined.267 It violates
the Eighth Amendment when withdrawal is an unavoidable part of a prisoner’s
confinement.268
Second, and most crucial to the analysis, the OUD policy in Pesce v.
Coppinger is a macro-level failure of the prison administration that warrants an
irrebuttable presumption of constructive knowledge.269 Here, the OUD
treatment policy is undeniably a feature of the prison’s medical system, similar
to Estelle v. Gamble.270 Policies and features of the medical system are a macrolevel failure because it would not be possible without state-created and
sanctioned incompetency on behalf of medical officials in the prison who should
have known their policies were dangerous to prisoners with OUD.271 Although
implemented by a few specific officials, an OUD policy so contrary to the
standard of care would not be possible without state officials willfully ignoring
modern science and medical advice in creating the medical system necessary to
administer prison sentences.272 Prison officials incorrectly categorized the
recommendation of Pesce’s doctor to continue his MAT as a “choice,”273 when
262

There is a narrow exception for pregnant women. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49, at 19l; see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
264
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
265
The fact that over-the-counter medication is provided for some physical side effects does not make the
prisoners’ experiences any less of a result of state-created conditions. Coppinger Memorandum, supra note 261,
at 9.
266
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371–73
(1910)).
267
See supra notes 224–27.
268
See Dolovich, supra note 212, at 960 (undertaking a similar analysis about why prison rape is a statecreated condition and illegitimate punishment).
269
Even in the case of macro-level failures, a plaintiff will still have to sue individual officers to comply
with the Eleventh Amendment and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See supra note 245 and accompanying
text.
270
See supra notes 254–56 and accompanying text.
271
See supra notes 244–46.
272
Defendants base their policy on the belief that prisoners “return to the community . . . drug-free, and
will not re-offend, thus reducing recidivism.” Coppinger Memorandum, supra note 261. There is ample evidence
to refute this reasoning. See supra Part I.A.
273
Coppinger Memorandum, supra note 261, at 17.
263
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in fact the standard of care is to continue MAT once started.274 Based on the
scientific evidence discussed in Part I,275 it is clear that in creating their medical
system, Defendants failed to adequately inform themselves of, or act on, the
overwhelming scientific evidence in favor of MAT and opposed to withdrawal
treatment. The result is a macro-level failure whereby any prisoner with OUD is
subjected to physical and psychological harm and the risk of overdose.
Accordingly, the irrebuttable presumption of constructive knowledge applies in
Pesce v. Coppinger.
Importantly, under the presumption of constructive knowledge, the official’s
justification for the policy is not considered because “serious physical or
psychological harm is never justified.”276 While judicial deference to official
policies is still possible and appropriate under the heightened negligence
analysis,277 the original Pesce Order cites the feasibility and widespread use of
a liquid form of MAT in prisons to prevent diversion to the general population,
and generally dismisses the defendant’s justification for prohibiting MAT.278
Additionally, judicial deference is inappropriate here because of three things that
make prisoners especially vulnerable to constitutional violations: (1) a failure to
recognize their humanity, (2) their coinciding disenfranchisement, and (3)
socially acceptable prejudice against them.279 The particular vulnerability of
prisoners is exacerbated when they have OUD because they are also subject to
a widespread belief that OUD is the result of a moral failure and that MAT is
just substituting one opioid for another.280 While the defendants in Pesce v.
Coppinger do not outright frame OUD as a moral failure, they do incorrectly
label MAT as a dangerous continuation of addiction.281 Thus, MAT for prisoners
is one of the more compelling examples of the protections Dolovich’s
framework adds to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because of the markedly
intersectional experience of prisoners with OUD as members of two politically
unpopular groups.282

274

Motion, supra note 76.
See supra Part I.A.
276
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 957; see supra note 257 and accompanying text.
277
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 963, 974.
278
Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35, 46 (D. Mass. 2018).
279
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 955, 975–76.
280
See supra Part I.A.
281
Coppinger Memorandum, supra note 260.
282
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 910, 974–77 (“[T]he judicial implementation of constitutional directives
is often shaped by instrumental concerns divorced from, [or] at times even at odds with, the moral imperatives
these directives embody—a phenomenon particularly evident when prisoners’ constitutional rights are at
issue.”).
275
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While cases like Pesce are no doubt important and noteworthy progress,
current scholarship indicates that a wider, sweeping Eighth Amendment holding
to protect prisoners who do not fit within the Pesce fact pattern may be difficult
to come by for two reasons. First, lower courts’ application of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has proven to be inconsistent, and in some cases, they
have even declined to apply Farmer and instead applied older cases.283 Second,
adding to the inconsistent application of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme
Court cases are also “highly deferential to prison administrators,” but the
deference accorded “varies with the jurisdiction and the particular court’s
standard.”284 Accordingly, while advocates may have a good idea of the array of
legal arguments available to them because of Pesce, a standard as malleable as
“deliberate indifference” means that success will vary, and access to life-saving
medication is not guaranteed in any specific jurisdiction.
Potential holdings and solutions are much broader under heightened
negligence because all prisoners with OUD should be protected by the holding,
regardless of their ADA status and whether they previously used MAT. Pesce
seemingly equates the Eighth Amendment and ADA arguments by finding both
theories plausible because MAT was clearly the plaintiff’s only successful
treatment.285 This resulted in very narrow precedent and uncertainty surrounding
whether the holding had much impact on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Because the conditions and treatment resulting from the OUD policy constitute
punishment and are never justified,286 the limitations of the Pesce holding
discussed above are irrelevant. Accordingly, there is greater opportunity to
ensure prisoners who need MAT have access to it and are not subject to the cruel
and unusual punishment of withdrawal.
Courts may be able to mandate more extensive access to MAT in line with
the Eighth Amendment. A few jurisdictions have already shown it is possible to
successfully and safely provide inmates with access to all three forms of MAT,
while other states have legislation pending.287 Because jails and prisons are

283

Siever, supra note 122, at 1393.
Jessa Irene DeGroote, Weighing the Eighth Amendment: Finding the Balance Between Treating and
Mistreating Suicidal Prisoners, 17 J. CONST. L. 259, 270 (2014); see also Dolovich, supra note 212, at 961
(describing “the strong tendency of the federal courts to defer to prison officials” and stating “[j]udicial deference
to prison officials is perhaps the strongest theme to emerge from a historical survey of prisoners’ rights litigation
in the federal courts”).
285
Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35, 47–48 (D. Mass. 2018).
286
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
287
Vestal, supra note 75. Jails and prisons can either become an accredited opioid treatment program or
contract with a “community-based” opioid treatment program to provide MAT. Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at
200 n.255. Rhode Island provides Methadone, Buprenorphine, and Naltrexone to any prisoner who needs it at a
284
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already required to conduct basic screening for substance use, a key piece of
infrastructure is already in place for identifying prisoners who may benefit from
MAT.288 While it is important not to underestimate the cost and planning that go
into implementing a MAT program in jails,289 such factors do not justify
continued violation of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights when the
alternative is likely death by overdose. A prison policy that exclusively provides
for withdrawal over MAT is not based on a difference of scientific and medical
opinion, but rather whether the prison violates prisoners’ Eighth Amendment
rights. These violations must be rectified.
D. Post-Release MAT: Punishment and the Issue of Intervening Causation
The high risk of post-release overdose is a result of the state’s failure to fulfill
its carceral bargain at a macro-level, and the provision of post-release MAT is
thus constitutionally required. Additionally, intervening causation is
inappropriate because it ignores the science behind addiction and allows the state
to avoid its carceral bargain. First, this section will discuss how the high risk of
post-release overdose death is a result of official state action taken while the
state has inmates in custody and is thus obligated to fulfill its carceral bargain.
Second, this section will explain why the same reasoning from the Pesce v.
Coppinger analysis applies, such that post-release overdoses are a macro-level
failure. Finally, because the Eighth Amendment has not been interpreted to

cost of about $2 million per year, as of 2018, while Massachusetts and Connecticut are considering similar
programs. Vestal, supra note 75. Additionally, the settlement agreement in Kortlever v. Whatcom County
requires Whatcom County to provide MAT for all prisoners who require it, indicating it is a feasible solution for
courts to reach. Press Release, ACLU Washington, supra note 196.
288
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT OF CO-OCCURRING DISORDERS
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (2019).
289
This Comment in no way suggests that implementing MAT programs in jails is a simple process.
Instead, it emphasizes that despite the complexity, it is possible and in fact constitutionally necessary to do so.
The National Academy for State Health Policy suggests that states consider state block grants, federal grant
funds, group purchasing MAT (to receive lower rates), and participation in the federal 340B Drug Discount
Program. Kitty Purrington & Chris Kukka, States May Soon Have to Provide Medication-Assisted Treatment to
Inmates, Here’s How to Fund It, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (July 23, 2019), https://www.
nashp.org/states-may-soon-have-to-provide-medication-assisted-treatment-to-inmates-heres-how-to-fund-it/.
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, Medicaid presents another potential barrier or resource, depending
on the state. Id. Specifically, in the instance of released prisoners, there are Medicaid waivers to cover reentry
services and management, and states can consider changing their Medicaid rules to make it easier for released
prisoners to resume Medicaid coverage and remain on MAT. Id. Kentucky will be the first state to treat OUD in
prisons with Medicaid money. Jacqueline Pitts, Kentucky Seeks to be First in the Nation to Treat Substance Use
Disorder in Prisons Using Medicaid Dollars, BOTTOM LINE NEWS (Nov. 16, 2020), https://kychamberbottomline.
com/2020/11/16/kentucky-seeks-to-be-first-in-the-nation-to-treat-substance-use-disorder-in-prisons-usingmedicaid-dollars/.
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apply outside of prison,290 this section addresses the issue of intervening
causation and why it should not defeat the argument for mandating the provision
of MAT to inmates post-release.291
First, releasing prisoners without continued access to MAT qualifies as
treatment that is “traceable to state-created conditions of confinement” and
therefore is punishment.292 Research shows that “[i]nstitutional treatment alone
. . . is rarely successful,” and the best indicator of success is “whether
participants experience a smooth transition to follow-up care . . . after
release.”293 Without such services, “[w]ithin [three] months of release from
custody, [seventy-five percent] of formerly incarcerated individuals with an
OUD relapse to opioid use” and face an extremely high risk of death because of
their reduced tolerance.294 Although now outside the prison walls, a former
inmate’s low tolerance and risk of death are traceable to the state-created and
sanctioned MAT policies discussed above.295 Post-release policies are a matter
of life or death.296
While MAT is not 100% successful, providing it post-release actually gives
former inmates with OUD a fighting chance to recover.297 If prisons do not
provide MAT post-release, many former inmates will find it impossible to secure
a dose within the first few days of their release because incarceration leads to
issues with insurance and transportation.298 Meanwhile, every day that former
inmates suffering from OUD do not obtain MAT puts them at a greater risk of
relapse and death.299 Because the former inmate’s conditions are clearly
traceable to their time spent in prison, they essentially continue their punishment
upon release via withdrawal or overdose. This is necessarily cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

290

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667–68 (1977).
Although a discussion of intervening causation seems slightly misplaced in the Eighth Amendment
context, it is necessary to include here for two reasons. First, it is a compelling argument to say the Eighth
Amendment stops at the prison gates, where the state and prison officials lose direct control over an inmate.
Second, OUD is still blamed on the individual instead of seen as an illness.
292
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 897; see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
293
SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 27.
294
Id. at 3.
295
See supra notes 259–64 and accompanying text.
296
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 166.
297
SAMHSA, see supra note 70, at 41 (citing a 60.5% “decrease in the overdose death rate among those
recently incarcerated” once a MAT program was implemented).
298
Id. at 57.
299
SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 26 (explaining that patients are generally on MAT for at least three years
before their provider begins to scale back the amount they take).
291
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Second, as in Pesce v. Coppinger, failing to provide MAT post-release is a
macro-level failure of the state’s carceral bargain because the decision is a part
of the specific facility’s release protocol.300 State officials had to create a release
protocol to administer prison sentences, and those same officials should have
known that a policy that failed to provide MAT was dangerous to prisoners as a
whole, as evidenced by the data.301 State officials either failed to educate
themselves on the standard of care or were indifferent to the dangers posed by
their release policies.302 Because the policy is a macro-level failure, constructive
knowledge applies, but as shown throughout this Comment, the post-release
overdose and death rates are well documented.303
Short of requiring rehabilitation, mandating the provision of post-release
MAT simply requires that the state not abandon a person in the middle of a
period of extreme medical vulnerability, brought on, in part, by their time in
prison.304 In other words, it requires the state to completely fulfill its carceral
bargain instead of unconstitutionally renouncing it at the moment of release,
when effects still emanate from the decision to incarcerate.305 Otherwise, failing
to address inmates’ increased vulnerability upon release, leaving them to likely
overdose within days, is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment.306
Third, because of the misconstrued beliefs that OUD is a moral failure, and
that MAT simply replaces one addiction with another, as well as the fact that the
Eighth Amendment traditionally does not apply outside of prison,307 a brief
discussion of intervening causation is appropriate. An intervening causation
argument against expanding the Eighth Amendment requires that the act was
“(1) independent of the original . . . act; (2) adequate by itself to bring about the
injury; and (3) not reasonably foreseeable.”308 Here, the first and second
elements need not be discussed because overdose is foreseeable based on the
science of OUD.

300

See supra notes 268–74 and accompanying text.
See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
302
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
303
See generally Introduction (explaining opioid death rates generally and post-release overdose rates
specifically).
304
See supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
305
Id.; see supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
306
See supra note 5.
307
But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 685–87 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing the Eighth
Amendment is not only limited to criminal punishment but also applies when the purpose of a punishment goes
beyond “those ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence”).
308
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 182.
301
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An intervening causation argument ignores the fact that OUD is a chronic
disease that rewires the brain.309 Forced withdrawal results in intense cravings
and the brain’s natural and foreseeable response is to seek out more opioids to
temporarily abate the cravings.310 Further, prisons are on notice about inmates’
OUD, and ignorance about OUD does not relieve officials of liability.311
Because prisons and jails are required to conduct screening for OUD when
booking the inmate,312 prison officials “are informed about the risk factors for
overdose post-release” of a particular inmate, and the third element is not met.313
Here, protection of an individual’s Eighth Amendment right should not be
thwarted by society’s harmful misconception of OUD.314 Characterizing a
former inmate’s overdose as an intervening cause would also allow the state to
shirk its carceral bargain by ignoring the fact that the state is in part responsible
for the post-release circumstances.
Accordingly, the state is constitutionally obligated to provide MAT postrelease. An inmate’s vulnerability post-release is directly linked to state policies
and actions that ignore the standard of care for OUD. These policies and actions
directly decrease the likelihood that a former inmate will survive an overdose.
Not only is this irresponsible and reckless but it is also contrary to the state’s
carceral bargain. Ignoring the post-release implications of prison MAT policies
truncates the Eighth Amendment such that former inmates are deprived of their
constitutionally guaranteed right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
E. The Slippery Slope Argument: Where to Draw the Line on Post-Release
Application
Expanding the Eighth Amendment to apply post-release naturally begs the
question of where to draw the line on its protections. The Eighth Amendment
should be applied outside of prison only when the cause of the harm is directly
linked to a micro- or macro-level failure of the prison administration.315
The argument for post-release MAT is distinguishable from other
rehabilitation services for which there is no constitutional guarantee.316 For
309

See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
311
See supra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
312
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 288.
313
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 182 (“[W]hen an intervening act is itself the foreseeable harm . . . a
defendant who fails to guard against the act will not be relieved from liability when the act occurs.”).
314
See supra notes 62–66 (describing the misconception that OUD is a moral failure instead of an illness).
315
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 946, 950; see supra notes 249–50.
316
JOEL DONAHUE, A GUIDE TO PRISON LITIGATION IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 35 (2014), https://www.
310
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example, another obstacle facing prisoners upon release is securing
employment, as many places do not hire people with a criminal record.317
Although job access can impact recidivism rates,318 it does not directly lead to
the same deadly results that failing to reconnect prisoners with MAT does.319
Nor is post-release job access attributable to a macro-level failure because it is
not related to prison conditions or policies in the same way that MAT is.320
Because other rehabilitation services do not implicate the carceral bargain, there
is no concern that the Eighth Amendment will suddenly apply to every aspect of
a former inmate’s life.
In conducting this analysis, courts could consider the extensive findings of
correlation between prison policies and harm instructive, as they are in the MAT
context.321 As evidenced by Pesce v. Coppinger, courts are capable of
considering—and willing to consider—statistics and science.322 Additionally, as
Justice Brennan pointed out in his concurrence in Rhodes v. Chapman, lower
courts also engage in nuanced and meaningful evaluations of prison conditions
similar to the analysis undertaken for post-release conditions.323
Further, the issue of intervening causation creates a natural limit to the
Eighth Amendment outside of prisons and jails. MAT presents the strongest case
for extending the Eighth Amendment because the fatal overdose rates associated

aclunebraska.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/eighth20circuit20prison20conditions20article20vii2020print20formatting.pdf.
317
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to Employment, 107 AM. ECON.
REV. 560, 563–64 (2017) (“[E]ven fairly minor felony records have large negative effects on employer callbacks
. . . .”).
318
Id. at 560.
319
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Although a lack of job opportunities arguably results in
suffering, cruel and unusual punishment still requires harm or a foreseeable risk of harm. See supra notes 229–
30 and accompanying text; Dolovich, supra note 212, at 897, 899–900, 930. Examples of harm have been limited
to physical or mental harm, not economic harm. Id. at 915–16, 921, 956. There is no indication that adopting
heightened negligence will force courts to include harms beyond those that are physical or mental.
320
See Dolovich, supra note 212, at 897, 899 (discussing prison conditions created by prison officials);
Coppinger Memorandum, supra note 261, at 5, 9 (summarizing the MAT process in a prison); Pesce v.
Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35, 45 (D. Mass. 2018) (discussing a prison’s failure to provide methadone treatment
to prisoners with opioid addiction); Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 157 (describing withdrawal experience
without treatment); Mann, supra note 75, at 240–41 (describing policies and reasons prisons choose not to
implement MAT); Bruce & Schleifer, supra note 49, at 19 (discussing the human rights aspect of providing
MAT to prisoners); supra notes 299–303 and accompanying text. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., supra note 50, at 1-4 to 1-14 (describing substance use and the societal costs).
321
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 166; Trickey, supra note 23.
322
See supra notes 183, 188 and accompanying text; Pesce, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 47; MARTON & DE LA
GUÉRONNIÈRE, supra note 189, at 24–25.
323
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363–64 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra
notes 168–171; supra Part II.B.

SCAVONE_6.15.22

2022]

6/21/2022 11:28 AM

BATTLEGROUND OF THE OPIOID CRISIS

1315

with prison policies are so clearly established by and emanate directly from
prison and jails’ actions.324 In the case of job access, on the other hand, the
employer is primarily concerned with the conviction, not the applicant’s prison
time.325 The applicant could have been sentenced to community service or house
arrest, but the employer would still focus on the conviction that resulted from
the individual committing a crime.326 Here, the conviction meets all the elements
of intervening causation: it is independent of the prison time, it is adequate by
itself to decrease employment opportunities, and it is not reasonably foreseeable
to prison officials because it necessarily happened before the prison sentence
began.327 It has no direct relationship to prison policies. Unavoidable overdose
upon release, however, is cruel and unusual punishment.328 The prisoner cannot
avoid it once sentenced, and it is therefore a prison condition.329
This example illustrates the feasibility of ending Eighth Amendment
protection once intervening causation is established. While there is not a brightline rule, the analysis is straightforward, and causation is already familiar to
courts. Intervening causation is established once it is clear that a micro- or
macro-level failure did not lead to the harm. Thus, although requiring postrelease MAT under the Eighth Amendment is novel, it is clearly workable if
courts employ the well-established concept of causation in the context of microand macro-level failures.330 Because causation is a relatively workable concept,
applying it to the Eighth Amendment may actually lead to more uniformity
among the lower courts.331
IV. MONEY AND LIVES SAVED: PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The societal and individual benefits associated with MAT are impressive.332
Methadone and Buprenorphine result in “as much as $58 savings for every dollar
324

See supra Part I; Beletsky & Goulka, supra note 5; Lopez, supra note 5.
Agan & Starr, supra note 317, at 561.
326
Id. at 560.
327
Beletsky et al., supra note 2, at 182 (outlining the three elements necessary for intervening causation).
328
See supra Part III.C.
329
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 899–900, 905, 913, 930; see supra notes 227–31.
330
Dolovich, supra note 212, at 954 (“True, the line between micro- and macro-level failures . . . will not
always be so easily drawn . . . [b]ut such indeterminacy is an insufficient reason to reject this approach.”).
331
See Siever, supra note 122, at 1393 (describing Estelle as establishing certain standards by which to
evaluate Eighth Amendment cases); DeGroote, supra note 284, at 267, 269 (discussing the unpredictable results
in cases that require proving deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials); supra notes 282–83 and
accompanying text (discussing the inconsistent application of the Eighth Amendment by lower courts).
332
Relevant to this section, MAT is a form of harm reduction, which aims to reduce harm to an individual
when they engage in risky behavior—in this case, using opioids. THE PLAYBOOK, IMPLEMENTING A HARM
REDUCTION APPROACH TO MEDICATIONS FOR ADDICTION TREATMENT IN OUTPATIENT SETTINGS 1 (2020),
325
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spent.”333 More importantly, these same drugs also “slash[] OUD patient risk of
overdose mortality” by fifty to eighty percent.334 This section will highlight the
promising statistics on the effectiveness of MAT, with a specific focus on Rhode
Island’s program.335
This section focuses on the effectiveness of MAT generally and the benefits
of providing MAT to inmates. There is limited data on the cost-effectiveness of
MAT post-release.336 However, the money and lives saved because of MAT
administered in prison is highest when services continue after an inmate’s
release, a potentially unstable and stressful time period during which relapse
may be appealing.337 Dr. Josiah Rich, co-director of Rhode Island’s Center for
Prisoner Health and Human Rights, says that following up with former inmates
by “helping them stay on insurance, and letting them use the same clinic they
used in prison” is key to a MAT program’s success.338 Continuity of services is
so important because a disruption in MAT after prison may make it impossible
to “successfully resume . . . treatment” and lead to the “loss of opioid tolerance”
that MAT in prison is supposed to avoid in the first place.339 Not only is it
https://www.bettercareplaybook.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Camden%20MAT%20Play_062320_final.pdf.
333
Beletsky, supra note 7, at 365.
334
Id.
335
This is a public health model of harm reduction that focuses on reducing “overall . . . social harm,”
which includes reducing lost wages, taxes, and government expenditures to compensate for the negative
externalities. Hoss, supra note 41, at 829; Harold Pollack, Moral, Prudential, and Political Arguments About
Harm Reduction, 35 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 211, 216 (2008). Alternatively, the human rights model advocates
for harm reduction on the premise that “drug users are deserving of the health care, safety, and freedoms of other
members of the public.” Hoss, supra note 41, at 829. While this model is beyond the scope of this Comment, it
is important for proponents of MAT to embrace for two reasons.
First, opponents of MAT continue to argue against MAT on a moral basis, while proponents tend to
focus on economic and scientific rationale. Instead, a more effective pro-MAT moral response that proponents
have failed to capitalize on is a focus on people like Mr. Pesce and Ms. Smith. Beletsky, supra note 7, at 367;
Lopez, supra note 5; Pollack, supra note 334, at 213 (“The public health community has stumbled in its efforts
to sidestep the moral and cultural politics of harm reduction . . . .”); Memorandum, supra note 11; Complaint,
supra note 7, at 14; Smith v. Aroostook County, 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 149–50 (D. Me. 2019); see supra notes
11–17.
Second, a moral argument is not misplaced within the Eighth Amendment context. As the Court held
in Estelle, cruel and unusual punishment is “incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency . . . of a
maturing society.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02
(1958)). Accordingly, there is room for an argument about what is morally right and wrong within the Eighth
Amendment, as this is surely part of any maturing society. A moral argument is a necessary response to MAT
opponents.
336
SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 22.
337
Lopez, supra note 5. Providing MAT post release may be even more complicated than providing MAT
to inmates, but Maryland is leading the way with new legislation requiring facilities to “provide follow-up
treatment and care coordination after release.” Purrington & Kukka, supra note 289.
338
Lopez, supra note 5.
339
Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35, 41 (D. Mass. 2018); see also SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 22
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constitutionally required to provide services post release,340 but it is also most
cost effective to help former inmates stay in recovery for the long term, as shown
by the figures discussed below. Accordingly, this section applies to both MAT
provided in prison and post-release.
A review of thirty studies on the cost-effectiveness of MAT show that,
despite “higher outpatient or prescription costs,” all three types of MAT are
“associated with lower total health care costs” by about fifty percent.341 All three
types are also cost-effective “relative to no pharmacotherapy” or only behavioral
therapy, like withdrawal or 12-Step programs.342 As of 2018, MAT was
estimated to cost about “$4,700 annually per person,”343 as compared to the
$24,000 cost of incarcerating one person annually.344 The money saved upfront
is impressive, but the long-term societal costs saved are staggering—the
potential to recover $25.6 billion in workplace productivity, $25 billion in health
care costs, and $5.1 billion in criminal justice costs per year.345
Rhode Island’s MAT program started in 2016 and provides all three forms
of MAT to prisoners, regardless of whether it was previously prescribed.346 The
program costs about $2 million per year and saw a sixty-one percent decrease in
fatalities within the first six months.347 But “lives saved” does not just refer to
fatalities, it also refers to inmates regaining independence and relationships, and
becoming productive members of society.348 Further, MAT is also associated
(“Any protective effects that might be achieved from prison or jail-based treatment appear to degrade quickly if
[MAT] [is] not delivered continuously in the community.”).
340
See supra Part III.D.
341
SEAN MURPHY, DAN POLSKY, ZACHARY MEISEL & JULIA MITCHELL, SHOW ME THE MONEY:
ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS OF OPIOID USE DISORDER INTERVENTIONS 1, 3 (2016).
342
Id. at 3–4.
343
SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 7. This is just an estimate for the actual medication. Best practice is to
provide patients with other services, such as therapy and a support system, which would add to the total cost but
is still well below the cost to care for an inmate for a year. See CRIME RSCH. GRP., VERMONT RESULTS FIRST:
INVENTORY AND BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH/DIVISION OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG
ABUSE PROGRAM’S MEDICATION ASSISTED TREATMENT FOR OPIOID USE DISORDER (HUB AND SPOKE) (2017),
https://blueprintforhealth.vermont.gov/sites/bfh/files/VT%20Results%20First%20Inventory%20and%20Benef
it-Cost%20Analysis%20for%20the%20Hub%20and%20Spoke%20Model%202017.pdf (describing the use of
specialty substance abuse treatment facilities (“Hubs”) and general medical offices (“Spokes”) as part of a
system of opioid treatment using a whole-patient approach).
344
SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 7.
345
Howard G. Birnbaum, Alan G. White, Matt Schiller, Tracy Waldman, Jody M. Cleveland & Carly L.
Roland, Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse, Dependence, and Misuse in the United States, 12 PAIN
MED. 657, 661 (2011).
346
Trickey, supra note 23.
347
Id.
348
Memorandum, supra note 11; Complaint, supra note 7, at 14; Smith v. Aroostook County, 376 F. Supp.
3d 146, 149–50 (D. Me. 2019); see supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text (detailing Pesce’s story).
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with a decrease in sexually transmitted diseases, crime victimization, and the
involvement of Child Protective Services, which, generally speaking, are
positive developments.349 One former inmate calls MAT “a godsend” and the
reason “[his] daughter finally can trust [him] again.”350 MAT not only saves
states money by “reduc[ing] criminal activity, arrests, [and] probation
revocations and re-incarcerations”351; the people receiving MAT retake their
lives as well.352
Thus, MAT is financially beneficial as well because it can reduce spending
on both incarceration and the opioid crisis in the long term.353 Although the
financial savings pale in comparison to lives saved, this is an effective starting
point and common ground for MAT advocates and opponents.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that in jails and prisons across the country, inmates suffer cruel
and unusual punishment because of anti-MAT policies. Worse yet, the state
continues to subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment by refusing to
provide MAT once they are released. This Comment argues that without MAT
both in prison and post-release, prisons and jails are violating the Eighth
Amendment. In effect, inmates have been informally sentenced to withdrawal
and eventual overdose. As it stands, the current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, coupled with a pervasive misunderstanding of MAT and OUD,
does not give full effect to inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights and cannot
remedy the paucity of MAT for inmates. Relying on the ADA to effectuate
inmates’ right to MAT is insufficient and inappropriately undermines the
magnitude of the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.

349
SAMHSA, supra note 70, at 4, 21, 23; Pamela Petersen-Baston, Methods of Engaging Family Courts
and Child Protective Services Through Opioid Treatment Programs and DATA 2000 Practices, in INCREASING
ACCESS TO MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT FOR OPIOID ADDICTION IN DRUG COURTS AND CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES AND WORKING EFFECTIVELY WITH FAMILY COURTS AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 1, 26 (2016).
350
Trickey, supra note 23.
351
Purrington & Kukka, supra note 289; see Beletsky, supra note 7, at 364; Lopez, supra note 5 (“[M]any
inmates are in prison because of their drug use; for example, about 39 percent of people in state prison for
property offenses said that they committed their crimes to get drugs . . . .”).
352
Memorandum, supra note 11 (detailing Mr. Pesce’s newfound economic independence and role in his
son’s life); see also Hoss, supra note 41, at 829 (“A human rights model for harm reduction justifies these
strategies because drug users are deserving of the health care, safety, and freedoms of other members of the
public . . . .”).
353
See generally Birnbaum et al., supra note 345 (describing a study on the estimated $55.7 billion
economic cost of opioid abuse and addiction).
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As society evolves, so too does the standard of decency that defines the
minimum protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment. Today, this standard,
as defined by science and ethics, includes MAT for inmates. In its current state,
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence fails both to recognize these evolving
standards of decency and to hold the state accountable for its carceral bargain.
This failure, coupled with the decades long opioid crisis, is a perfect storm that
has resulted in countless lives lost. It is therefore imperative that courts adopt a
heightened negligence standard and a micro- and macro-level harm analysis for
Eighth Amendment cases. This framework will hold the state accountable and
prevent more senseless overdose deaths upon release to combat the relentless
opioid crisis.
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